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INTRODUCTION 
John Dune 600tu8 proposes In his philosophy two aots of 
knowledge. the abstractive and the intuitive. Intuitive knOw-
ledge is the knowledge of a thins present and existing, as 1t 1s 
present and existing. Abstraotive knowledge, on the other h.s.nd, 
can be had of an object whether it 1s present or not and whether 
it 1s existing or not. 
Duns SootU8 proves the neoessity tor add1ng the aot of 
intuit!",. knowledge to the act of abstractive knowledge on the 
baaia of the adequaoy of 9i1ns as the proper object of the in-
'allect attainable by intuitive knowledge ln an eminent degree, 
since the proper object ot sense knowledge 1s attainable by In-
tultive knowledge. This is the argument based on the analo81 
w1 th senee knowledge. Sootus proves his point also trom the 
knowledge of our interior acta wblch must be iutu! tlYe, tro.tn In .... 
tellective memorl which is a recall of the actually existl.ne; 
thing. and from our knowledge of oontingent truths which predi-
cate aotual. existence of a. subject. If we are to have the 1n-
tuitive knowledge that exists in the beatific vision, tbere muet 
be a natural capacity 1n man pre-exist1ng th1s type of knowledg& 
Tl1$ capaoity 1s natural, while the 81tt itself 18 aupernatural 
and endowed by God. 
1 
The intuitive knowledge Qf a thing as aotually present 
in its concrete existence postulates the individual being as the 
proper object of the intellect. The concept ot being is the pro-
duct of both abstractive and intuitive knowledge, and i. univocal 
and adequate as to motivation and predicat10n. The indlvidual 
belng as object of the lntell~ot is made up of the tortn$11ties of 
the common nature and 1ndividuality or haeecelty, termally dls-
tinct, but in reality identioal. The tormal distinction between 
the individua11ty and the common nature produoes the individual 
being and serves as the foundation tor intuitive knowledge. 
Wi th the sensl ti ve power or taoul ty of the soul tor-
mally distinct, but really ident1oal. with theintellect1ve tao,"" 
ulty or power •• allowlng to the 8gtp ot these powers a real dls-
t1notion--the s1m1lar1ty between sense knowledge and intelleotual 
knowledge as be1ng intu1t1ve takes the torm of an identity, pro-
perly d1stingUishing intelleotual 1ntuit1ve knowledge to exist in 
an eminent degree over sensitive 1ntuitive knowledge. 
Endeavor. will be made to present the dootrine of John 
Duns Sootus on intuitive knowledge. The doctrine on univocal 
being and the formal distinction w111 be presented to Sl"$ a 
better undersftand1ng 01' 1ntui t1 ve knowledge. Adequa~e Judgment 
on the doctr1ne ot John Duns Sootus concern1ng 1ntUi 1',i ve know-
ledge can be g1ven, if his doctrlne 1s oons1dered as a log1oal. 
development trom his own pr1noiples of philosophy, namely, the 
unlvooity of being and the formal d1st1notlon. 
~------------------------------------, 
CHAPTER I 
INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE IN THF PHILOSOPrrr OF JOHN DUNS aCOTUS 
The philosoph1cal doctrine of a man ie passed on \0 pos. 
terity through his writings. $ souroe more certain tha.n oral tra-
dition. However. eVen into the writlngs ot a man may oreep works 
that are not his, because 01' the over-zealousness of hls tollow-
ers to glve to their master proper credit, or because of inadver-
tenoe and 19no;c'Qnce. The.t'e a.re at p.r$aent two ohief sources for 
the works of John Dune Sootuel the Wadding edition and the Vives 
edition. These editions inolude the spurious with tbe authentio 
works of Sootus. The 600tist10 oomm1aalon. however, d1reoted at 
present by Charlel Ball?, O.F.M., 1s now worklns at Rome meticu-
lously and labor1ously on an." cr1tioal edit10n that purports to 
lnolude the authentio works of' $Ootu8, 'lbe best orit1ce.l re&Ungs 
of thoae works, ...... two volumes of which a.re publlehed .... -and 'What. 
promises to be an unbiased and taotual 11te of Scotua, being 
wr1 "t.en by Ephrell Longpr*', o. F1' 1"1., the tonner dlrec tor 0 f the OOIJloi 
misslon. This purifioation after a century and .. halt' of obli-
vion t.ends to eliminate the oontradiotions in the 'WOl?ks Of Seo-
tUG, and heralds a new !lowering of philosophy, in the place of 
lts dCtcadenoe. 
4 
The results of the critioism to whioh the work ot Duns 
sootus has been subJeoted hal thrown a new light on hi. 
philosophy. Contrad1ctions disappear, the l1nks with the 
past are stronger, the constructive value is more evident, 
and we now see the genius of the FranCiscan master in a v_r.r 
different light trom that in which 1 t was formerly place4.l.-
IntUition 1s a vague and ethereal term, misunderstood 
very muoh, when it is understood at all. 
M.DeMunnynolt, O.P.~ in his excellent study on intui· 
tion" bas passed on to us a rather complete division of the kinde 
ot intuition that exist. Most oommon of all is the ~pe~cept1v. 
intuition" where ~sen.lble objects impose themselves on our per-
oeption without any 1ntermediary.tt2 The peroeptive intuition 
dominates our whOle imaginatIve lite. The "1magin&tlve intui-
tion" reveals, as it 1n a dream, a wholly imaginative world by 
means of an internal vieion.' On the next step up is the "lntra-
rational intuition", 1n whioh "everyone at some time or another 
gets a new Idea, & new image, whlch is not the fruIt ot reasonlns 
something wh1c11 is offered brusquely to the attention of 'lihe 
mInd."4 The Intuition of genius, of inventiveness, of Indivl~ 
dualIty is the infra-rational intUitIon. nFundamen~ 1ntelleo-
tual intuition" 1s the 1mmediate grasp ot the object common to 
.... 
1 l-!aurice DeWU. 1t, Hls.\gU aJ: HlA!,Yti l~S9R91:, 
trans. Ernest C. Messenger, Londin. 19'7, II. 9, • 
2 M. De14~ok. 0.1'., "Notes on Intu1tIon," %hi. %b2mi,~, It 19'9, 146. 
, n1A., 148. 
4 .Ib14., 151. 
the mind, 11'h& intuitlon--to what degree ot clarlty it rnal be--ot 
be1ng as suoh. "To the unique na.ture of the intelligence there 
should oorrespond a common object. All that we oonCelve must 
present a common aspect rendering 1t intelligible. This common 
aspect, we soon discover, 1s nothir~ other than ~!1n6, taken 1n 
all 1ts fullness.uS The "post-rational intu1tion" 1s the pro .... 
gressive vlsion on conolusions the mind dev,elops in 1ts t.hlnk-
1ng.6 ·Supra-rat1om),1 1ntul tion" 1s a vis10ning of thinss -abo". 
reason, 8.111 tor example, the harmonious reasonableness exlst.lng 
between the infinite meroy and the inf1n1te Justice of God. 7 
The "lllY8tr1oal 1ntu1 tlon" of the salnts 113 the pure vision of 
God. a 
IntUition, as its a1snlf1oance appears 1n the pages ot 
the philosophy of Duns Scotue 1s a \ype of 'libe intellectual in-
tuition. 5ooti81110 intuition is the act of understanding an Ob-
Ject both as ao'liualll preeent and actually existing. This act ot 
lntui tlon is distinct from tbe act of Ui"1derstanding. called. ab-
straotion, which is indifferent to the $xistenoe or non-existence 
ot the object, as well as to 1ta presenoe or absenoe. Why ahoul4 
there be possible suoh an aoto! intuitive knowledge 1n addition 
5 ~b1d. , 154. 
6 ~., 156. 157. 
7 ~., 159-161. 
e lb.14. , 164. 165. 
I"" 
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t.o abstraotlve knowledge' Duns Scotus gives the followinganewer 
as proof for intuitive kno'Wledse. Every absolute cosnitional pel' 
t.ation that inheres in the sensitive faculty of knowledge should 
eminently inhere 1n the intelleotual faoulty of knowledge. )fow 
lt 1s proper t.o the perfeotion of aotual knowledge to gralp COil. 
pl.tell 1t.f1rst known obJeo:t. The obJeot is not oompletel, 
grasped, when it 1s not grasped in 1tselt. but in a cer1iain 41-
JD1nlshe4 llkeness derived trom 1t. The .ena1tiVe faoulty pos .... 
eesses this perteotion in 1ts knowledge, because lt can gra.p th. 
object 1n ltself,. as 1t 1s actually existing and aotually pre-
.ent. The sensitive faoulty does not grasp t.he obJeot 1n a dl-
m1nished resemblance and ln a oertain dimlnished perteotlon. 
therefore, th1s kind of knowledge should 1nhere ln the intelleo-
tlv. taoultl. and oannot lnhere there, unless that tacultl know 
lts object as actually ex1stlng and .s aotually present, O~ in 
some 1ntelligible obJeot em1nently oonta1n1ng thls flrst known 
obJeot.9 
9 Joanne. Duns Seottle, Qw+es~'2nll !i\Y9sYt'btta.~., 
q. VI, n. ~t . puns SPO~i ~ Qma.I, ed. V1ves, par a, I I.1895, 
xxv. 243, 244: late aotuj-llitelllsend1 • • • potelt sat1a proprie 
4101 abstractlvus, qula abatrahlt obJeotum ab ex1attentla et non 
exletentia, praesenti. et ab.entia. Allus autem actus in\.lll-
sendl, quem tamen non 1t. oertltudlna.llt.r exper1mur in nobie. 
pOssibllie \amen eat talls, qui .0.1110e' praeoiae a1 t obJect1 
praesentl. ut praesentls, et exIstent is ut existentis. Hoo pro-
batur, qula omnie perfeetio cogn1tlonls abaolute, quae poteet 
Oompellere potentla. 00gn1t1ve. senslft!" .. , poteet em1nen1ier oom-
pet ere potentla. cogn1t1" •• 1ntellectlvae, nuno aut.a pertec'tio-
nls est in actu cognoscendl. ut cognlt10 eat, perteet. attlngere 
7 
While Duns 5cotus modifies the theory that says our 
knOwledge ls the result, of abstraction alone, he admits that the 
theory of intuitive knowledge lupplemente the theory ot abstrao-
tion. In abstract1v,. knowledge the intelleot abatraots the ob-
jeot from existence and non-existenoe. from 1ts presence and ab-
senoe. 'there i8 another k1nd of knowledge, however, whlcb focu-
seS precisely upon a present objeot as present. and on an exist-
inS object as existing. The evidenoe tor this addit10nal kind ot 
knOwledse flowa from an analogy with sense knowledge. Any cogni. 
tlve perfeotion that belongs to aenae knowledge should belons 1n 
an eminent degree to intelleotual knowledse. We know perteC1i17, 
when .. know the obJeot in itself, not when we know the obJeot 
~nl1 in aome diminished sim1larity or in some limilarlty derived 
from the obJeot. lense knowledge ia pertect knowledge, beoaus. 
lenee atta1ns its object a8 1t is 1n 1tsel!, a8 ex1sting, and aa 
present in 1ta real ex1stenee. Perfeot knowledge of this kind 
should also portain to the intellectual tacnlltJ. since the sensl-
pr1mwn cogn1tt;ll' non a.utem perteote attingltur, quando non in .e 
• tt1ns1t.tU", sed tantummodo 1n allqua diminuta, vel 4er1vat,a simi-
11 tud1ne ab Ipso J sens1 tl va. autem ta bet hane perteot1on.em in OOS"" 
~1tlone SUA. quia potelt obJectum att1ngere 1n se, ut existens, 
et ut,pre.esena est in ex1stentis. reali, at non tantum diminut. 
-.ttlngendo lpaum in quadam perfeotion. d1m1nuta, ergo lsta per-
teot10 eompet1t intellect!vae in oognoscendo, se4 non poss.t alb1 
competere, nisi cognosoeret existens, 8t ut in existent1a propria 
praesens est, vel in allque obJeoto lnte11ig1b1l1 em1nenter lpsum l~y~t1nen. te • •• Se. also ~ 2Mmsmll. IV, 4. 49. q. 12, XXI, 
.,...a, .Q.2.t!i gxonltQ,!. II, d. ',' q. 9. XII, 212, 213. 
~---------------------------------, 
8 
\lye power,'" conJ01ned to an Intelleotual soul and an organ, as 
tor example, vls10n. 1s really identIcal with the soul, slne. the 
.ensitive power Is cons 14ere4 as a vlrtue of the soul Ita.l!, 
which do •• not need operation unless united to the organ,lO and 
also because of the adequacy ot unlvocal being as the object ot 
ih. Intelleot. Of un1Yocity and the formal distinction ~re wlll 
be sa1d 1n later ohapt.ers. Therefore, the intelleot oan know. 
thlng as ex1sting and aa 1t 1s present In It. own exIstence. 
ThIs knowledge mal be called intu1tlve knowledge, 1n the .trlct 
sense of the term; 81noe 1t 1s an intuItion of the thing •• 
aot.ualll pr •• ent and exlstlng.ll 
, 
Ephrem Longpre calls the basis of t,h8 concept of un1"", 
vocal 'being that 1s the adequate object of the 1nt,elleO\ and tbe 
product of th.intelleot·. proces8 of abetrut1ve and Intuitive 
knowledge the individual Ens. The indlY1dual being is an obJeot 
ot thought, and 1 t 1s ,be Only real1 tl whlch exists in taot. 1'be 
individual beIng 18 constituted of the quiddIties or formalities 
of individuality and the common nature, both of whioh fir. tor-
mally d1st1not. tbat 1s to aal. really identical. A more com-
". . .-------------------, 
plete explanaftion of the formal distinction will follow in aM.p-
'er III. In order to reaoh the quidd1ties of indiViduality, fthe 
concrete and aotual existenoe of the individual belng, and of the 
oommon nature, the ideal qu1ddity, abstractlve and intuitive kno 
ledge must be employed. Abstractlve knowledge reaohes ~h. object 
1n its ldeal q\114411;" or in 1.ts common nature, through the In-
tell1e;lble Ipee1 •• Wh10h moves the 1ntellect. Intuit1ve know-
I.CIs. reaohes the ObJect in 1t. existent1al reality, 01' 1n 11;s 
individuality. through the thing present 10 itself whioh dlrectly 
DlOves the 1ntellect4 Intul tl ve knowledge grasp. in,medlately the 
thing ltself present 1n it. conorete existence, and 1t also 
grasps the real and objeotlve aspeots of the EnS, the first 1~ 
tentlons of be1ns. or the nature as natut'e. By this dual know .... 
ledge the mlnd has a complete and a d1rect grasp of the Indi-
vidual. 
AS an object of thought, the individual EnS 1. also the on11 
reality which exlsts 1n fact. In order to reach 1ts eon-
orete and aotual eXistence, and to give us an 1deal repre • 
• entatlon. aocordlng to nuns acotul, two way. present them-
.elvesl the abstractlve and the intUitlve cognitlon, The 
forJ1ier 1s based on abstraction, 1t do •• not reach lta obJect 
ln ltaex1st-ential realIty. bu\ in its ideal quiddity; thie 
ls the foundatlon of 801enoe 1n the Aristotelian .enee ot 
tbe word, thanks to the abstraot concepts which 1 t elabo-
rate.. Intuit1ve cognition, on the contrary, ls a direot" 
vlew of the obJect. 1t touches immedlately the thlng ltael! 
1n its conere'. exlstence, a.s well as the real and obJec-
tlve aspects of the Ene, whioh the S.Cholastl0. call ~­fliPs. llrlm~ ent1s • In abstractive cogn1t.lol1, the I'ii'tiI .... Igl~e speces moves the 1nt.elleot, ln the lntu1tive cog-
nItion, on t.he oont.ra!'1. lt 1s the obJect, .til. P£afI IUll1D B. 
It 11 1n th1s double fash10n that. the ~1nd d1rectly 
~-~------------------------I 
10 
grasplif the indIvidual •• " • 12 
The 600ti8t10 o.oncept of the individual being, made up 
of the common nature and the individual difterenoe or baecoe1ty, 
differs vastly from the Aristotelian-Thomistio composite, oonsti-
t.uted ot prime matter and substantia.l form, whioh are really cUe-
tinct. Abstraotlve knowledge ~eaches as tar a.s the essence or 
common nature. IntU1 tlve knowledge complete. the process by 
reaoh1ng the flrst intentions 01' being, the existential presenoe 
e.h1ning through the 1nM. vidual1 t1. In abstraotion the inttelll-
g1ble speCies motivates the intellect, but the thing present in 
itself 1s the motivating obJeot in IntuitIve knowledge. 
To safeguard our oertitude about the existenoe of ob-
Jects outs1de the mind Scotul postulate. intuItive knowledge in 
addition to abstraotive knowledge. The abstracted species pre-
.ents to the mind the quiddIty.of the object devoid of It. aotual 
oonditions, telling us nothing of 1ts actual exlet.ence, sinoe it 
preac1nds from the obJect's existenoe or nen-ex1stenoe. Abs~e. 
tion is an imperfect kInd of knowledge, since the obJeot 1s not 
present in ltself, but 1s present through the intermediary ot a 
speOies that represents the object imperfectly. The intellect 
should ha.ve the prIvIlege of' a more perfeot type of knowledge, as 
.. 
11 
,iven ln 1ntuit1ve knowledge, sinoe the sense faculty. inferior 
1D 1t8 cognltion to the intelleotual fa.culty. reaches lt8 object. 
pertectly 1n ita actual presence .and ooncrete existence. B'1 this 
intuitive knowledge the lntellect has the impresslon of 11t., 
tbAt le, of things as they are existing and in the concrete. 
"Intu1tive cogn1tlon is ln ltself a more perfect manner of 
knowlng than abstractlve cogn1t10ns in 1ntu1t10n, the obJeot 
ls g1ven as present 1n ltself and not by the lntermedlar.y of 
a speoles which represents lt imperfeotlYJ wl4er thie head! 
it ls fittlng to endow reason wlth the priv11ege ot lntu1-
tlon, and thls, so muoh the more because .ense. whioh 1s an 
lnferlor oognitive faoulty. enjoys it and reaohes ooncretely 
lts obJeot. Without 1ntuitlon, the intellect would never 
have the impression 01' lite, of the ex1stlng and 01' the con-
crete, for the abstraot, speoies represents preo1Mly the 
quiddity ot the obJeot outSide of all its aotual oonditions, 
and tMch •• us noth1ng about lts existenoe." "In etfeot," 
800tus contln~~I, "abstractlve oogn1tlon represtmts equally, 
in an ideal matmer, a th1ng that, exlsts or that do •• not ex-
1st, an. obJect present or not; accordingly, it 1. impossible 
to obtain by thl$ means. oognit1on ot a t.hing as far aa 1t 
1s exist1ng and present to t,he subjeot whioh peroeive. 1t. 
It 1s necessary, then, that the lntelleot be endowed w1th 1n 
tuition, otherwise it would not have e:rq oertltude of the ex 
lstenoe of any obJeot whatsoevert itim ln3tl,leftf! !lQ1l 
ISI.t Hr~y! M !flg!!!. Ha.st~tn;;fl ______ 212Jeoll. It .. 
Following the argument 1n tavor ot intu1tive knowledge 
trom the analo8Y Wlth Sense knowledge, 5001;u8 proposes the argu-
ment from the knowledge of our lnter10r acts. 800tU8 says that 
lt we would not have an 1ntuit1ve knowledge ot 80me objeot, we 
would not know whether our aots are wlthin us or not with any de-
gree of cert1tude. It 18 a taot. however, that we do know 'that. 
our 1ntrinsio aots of intelleotlon and wil11ng, along with our 
-
12 
,ense knOwledge belong to our Ego. I ponder. I wonder, I want., 
I need, I desire; I see, I feel. EXper1enoe teaches tMs. It 1. 
Jlot a questlon of "it 1s thought. it 1s seen". Therefore, the 
same reasons tbat hold good tor plaoing the indiv1dual beins .a 
the object 01' 1ntu1tive knowledge, hold 8004 tor any being what-
including our interior act~.14 
Intuitive knowle4se 1s the knowledge ot • conc.r-etel, 
present object, insotar .a 1t 1s actually existins. The soul. 
apprebends itself oonoretely with no intermediary. In th1s way 
also ~. soul apprehends its acts and its states ot oonsoious-
nee.. This i8 an intu1tion we experienoe of our inner aote. our 
interior acts are present to ouraelves and existing within us, 
and our knowledge of them 1s a knowledge ot them as present and 
exletlng. This is intuitive knowledge ot our intrinsic aotl, the 
revelation ot our consoious act., revealing i tselt w1 th the JJue-
oes.lve states 01' our thoughts and volltions. This 1s the psy-
cholog1cal lntui tlon of the Ego. Longpre tells us that 
psychologlcal lntultion 1s an immediate perception, t.he act 
ot an interior .ense by which the soul apprehends 1tself 
w1thout any intermediate agent, as well as 1ts operations 
and lts states of COnso1enoe: ~dy !,ASH, !A .t!i. J2!ro!Pt~-
2D! inter1or! IXptr1myt. In t '8 apperoept1on thi soUl 
14 Scotus, ~Q!2nlinsl. IV, 4.49, q. 8, XXI, 
306s ••• 51 non haberemu8 4e arIque cognlt!onem lntultlVAm, non ~!~remus de aot1bus nostri, 81 lnsunt nobls, vel non cert1tu41-4~lter (de aotibu8 dlco lnt»1naeC1s), sed hoo est ialauro, ergo, 
eto. ergo eadem ratione qua pon1e unum ena posse 1ntuitive oog-
t nosol, et quodo,umque. l~l------------------------~I 
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... 
apprehends itself concretely. AS an experienced intu1tion. 
808 consclence, or 11ght of our Consoious acts; 1t renews 1'to-
self in proportion as our thoughts and our acts ot will suc-
ceed each other. 1t reveals the existence of' the Ego, 1ta 
ontologioal tendenc1e8, and its lxnmanent operatlonstbut no-
thlng beyond their presence and the assurance that 'tohey 'be-
long to the subject which experienoes them • • •• The 
supernatural esoape. the grasp of' psyohological experlenoe. 
Likewise. intuition dOes not sive us the knowledge of the 
nature or even ot the essenoe ot the soul.IS 
Longpre goes on to explain that when We wlsh to fix the 
proper obJeot ot a faoulty, we prooeed "trom the very nature 1t ... 
aelf' of the immanent act peroelv.A by internal experienoe, an4 
not preoisely from the essenoe ot th1s faculty, oonsidered a.b-
straotly_ "16 Proceed1ng f'rom the essence ot the intellect. con-
sidered abstraotly, we should say that, s1nce the human oomposite 
is cOluJi;1tut.ed of a form in matter, the soul sUbatant,iaIly unlted 
to the 'body. human knowledge should prooeed along the lines ot 
abstraoting the torm from matter) b$cause there ls a proportion 
in the modes of existenoe betWeen the obJeot of knowledge and the 
faoul t1 of knowledge. Thie thought will be expanded in the s .... 
oond chapter, Proceed1ns. however, wlth DUns scotue from t;he 
very nature 1tself of the intrinsic act aa percelved by internal 
-.. 
I 
15 IQnspre. "The PS10h010~ of Duns Sootua and its Modernlty,~ 26, 27. saotus, QRHl QXt~lnS., IV, d. 4,. q. 2, 
n. 2, xx. . 
16 lliJ&., 29. scotus, QXtllitfl1 l19.§S9tt1GRlb Ch 1, 
n,l), VIII, a'fExOepto aotu quem exp.r~mur, conclud1mua poten-
t1tl.m et naturamt ouJus iste actus est, 111Ud resploere pro OD-Jeoto qUOd perclplmas attingi per aotum, ita quod obJectum poten ... 
tia. non conclu41tur ex oognit1on. potentia. led ex oognition. 
L 
-
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experience; seen in our introspections, we see several things 
~b&t lead us to estab11sh the proper object ot the 1ntellect. 
,rom the very nature ot the internal act as perceived by psyoho-
logical intuition, we experience the incapa.oity otthe 1n't,elle.,\ 
w embrace at the aame time actually and concretely &n 1nf1n1te 
nWilber ot objects, and that tbe intelleot Wlderstands quit. in-
dist1nctl, .. larse number of objects, taken aotualll and con-
eretell ate the same t1me, it these obJeot. are understood throUSb 
a variety ot spe01es.11 SeoondlJ, psycholog1cal 1ntuition show. 
us 't,he 1mperfeot1on and tbe l1m1 te ot hwnan knowledse.18 F1naUa 
introspection teaohes us that our lntellectual aots succeed on. 
atkr the other. having an exis 'enee after a non-&.Xistence. and 
are not perpetual.19 SinOe the intellect 18 imperfeot, l1m1ted, 
. . 
and incapable 01.' grasping a tnul t1 tude of objects at the. lAme time, 
but proceeds fro.m one intelleotual aot to another, it follows 
t 1 _ .... 
actue quem experlmur, 
17 ~. SOQtU8, feporta!l flf!&t!n!ll. III, d. 14, 
q. ,. n. 5, XXlllt '56. Exper mUl' quO nel ectus noa\e,r non .. extend1t 11mul &0 ua11ter in int1n1ta nec ex~ender. poteat 1mo 
valde indistinct. intelllS!t plura s1mul actu sl 111a 1o'.!11-gentur per diver.as species. 
18 lW. Scotu8, Q.lImi i{Qniensl • lIt d. " q. 9L n. 2, XII. 216, Opus Oxoniense, Ill, 4. • q.2, n. 20, XIV, ,1"(. 
19 l.b.1d. 8OOtu6, QllW! Qlgp.lep!l. I, 4. ,. q. 7, n. 30, 
IX, 361 •••• -rniellect10 actuiI1s est ailqUld 1n nobis non per-
petuum "4 b.a.bens esse post non esse 810ut experlm.ur. 
~----------------------------------------, 
15 
there must be one proper object ot the intellect, the individual 
being. 
Duns scotus believes that every singular is ot itselt 
intelligible, even though the singular may not be as equally in-
telligible to every intellect. Sinoe the understanding is the 
fa.culty that naturally grasps ,the entire being in its essence and 
and in its ex1stence, and since in the singular there i8 nothing 
that stands outSide of being, everything within the s1ngular be1~ 
1s intelligible by its very na.ture. Sinoe tbe individual in 1t ... 
selt possesses w11ty, the individual being is intelligible in It-
eelt and directly. SCOtu8 says 
fttha1i every Singular, to whatever genus it belongs, 1s ot it,. 
self intelligible, although it way not be equally so to 
ever-s int-elleot. consequently, sinoe the understanding i8 
the ta.culty of the entire Ene, and Since in the singular 
there 18 nothing whioh is not posit1vely EnS, all tha.t 18 1n 
the singular Ens 1s intell1gible by 1te very nature. More-
over, the indiv1dual 1n itaelf is endowed w1th un1t1= 1t 1s 
then intellig1ble by ltself and d1rectly.~20 
It we d1d not know direotly our interior acts, both the 
intellectual and ot the 1nter1or senses and sensation, we would 
have no proof tor the eXistence of our 1ndividual soul from the 
permanency ot the Ego through our successlve and var1ed acts. 
Th1s would lead to the lmpermanent, ever-flitting "states of oon-
so1ousnese~, as the substrate of personal1ty, instead of the Ego 
or the soul. The ground tor the direct lu)owledge ot the selt as 
.... 
20 lb'~.' 40. Sootus, BIPPrtat! larisl!nela, III, d. 14, q. 3. n. • XXII, 357. 
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ih1nk1ng wdUld wash away. Introspection would disappear, along 
w1th knowledge and soienoe. The internal evidence tor the d1reot 
)tnowledge of our interior aots denied, ... ·how else oan we know 
tnem?--common sense is denled f since one denies onets self. The 
result oould lead anywhere. to a state of doubt at the least. 
we now come to the third of the quintet of proofs Dune 
sootus of tel's in favor of intuitive knowledge. 
One ot our 1nter1or aota is the power ot rememberlng 
things, on t.he sens1ble level, as on the level ot 1nt.ellectlon. 
Th$re 1e .1n the 1ntelleot the power ot recollect10n 1n rela.tion 
to a universal obJeot, and even in relation to a Singular object. 
in add1tion to ac"ts of the w111. Were it othel'w1se, we would 
bave to deny the sanctIons ot pWllsbment and reward, tor we re-
oall the indivIdual deeds that deserve reward and teel happy, or 
that deserve punishment and teel guilty, In this wa,y reoollec-
tion is proper to the intelleot, but there is a oertain kind of 
recollection common to the intelleotive and sensitive faoulty in 
man. There 1. the recollectlon on the part of the interior sen-
sitive powers. Just as the intellect can perceive my act intui-
tIvely or abstraotively, In the aot of understanding, so the 
sense can record whether 1t 'be an aot proper to the intellect, 
or proper to some otber facul·ty.21 
-
21 Scotus, BfPOttaif far1S~lne1A' IV, d. 45, q. " 
n. la, ;(XIV, 514: ... ,. reoor r non est partie seUl.s1tiva., sed 
I I 
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I~tuitlve knowledge is not only ot the singular, but 
•• sent1ally lt is at the ex1sting nature itself, as existing. 
Intellective memory is also of a past obJeot previously eXisting, 
not as singular, but as this singular, as existing, which is not 
out ott from the universal, although it may be out otf from the 
abstractive quiddity througb the operation ot tlle intelleot, A 
rose ex1st,lng at t,be present is not out otf from the universal 
conoept, upon whioh sclence ls tounded, even though the universal 
baS not reaohed 1ts ultimate grade ot abstraotlon. 22 
-
lntelleotivae. Reoordatio 8n1m non tantum est 1n 1nte1leotu re-
.pectu obJeotl un1versalis, imo respectu obJeoti s1ngular1s, et 
aotus voland! s1mili tel', alias oportet negare poenas e\ praem1a. 
• • • Unde 4100 quod 1sta r8cor4&tl0 est proprla lntelleotua, 
quae non est al terius, sed tantwn est reoordatl0 a.otu.s 1ps1us in-
telleotus et voluntat1s. Sed alla est. s1militer reeordatl0, quae 
e.t commun1s sib! at allis, s0111cet part! intellect1vae et sen-
alilv ... , nam quaedanl est reoord&t10 potent1arum lnter1orum, scl-
110et sensitlvarum: slout enlm 1ntelleotus poteet peroipere actum 
meum intuitive vel abstra.otive, intelllgendo, 1ta posset sensus 
recordarl, s1ve sit aotus proprius lntelleotus, sive allarum 
potent1a.rum. 
22 ~., n. 1', XXIV, 575, 576= cognitio lntultlva 
non est tantum s1ngularis, 1nQuantum est 008Oltl0 lntu1tiva, sed 
essen't,1al1ter est ipelus naturae existentls , ut ex1etens est, 
quia pr1us competlt esse naturae, quam slt ut haec sive ut s1n-
gulare, eo quod assentia s1 t eJuedeln ratlon1s 1n omnibus sln,su ... 
lar1bus, non autem slngularitas ipsa est ejusdem ration1s in 
omn1bus, fed. d1verse. ln quollbet singula.r! unlue essentlaeJ ex 
quO sequitur quod essent!a poteet cOSnQec1, non tamen slngular1-
tas eJus. cum 19itur ad recordatlonem non requirltur nie1 pree-
terltwn pr1us exist.ne. 1108t non ut 81ngulare, ldolroo esto quod 
singulare, ut tale, non lntelllg1tur a.b 1ntellectu, lntell1g1tur 
tamen allquld slngular., non ut slngulare, sed ut lntellls1tur, 
.t tale e1..'1e;ulare, ut eXletene. non reoedit ab universa.11, 110et 
a qUldd1ta~ abstractlva per lntellectum recedat, qula rosa nunc 
ex1stene non reced1t a rosa. universa11, de qua solentla est, 11. 
Cet non slt universale 1n ultimo sradu abstraotlon1e; et 1ta dloo 
ri-
18 , 
1h1s 1s the third of the quintet of proofs ScotU8 pro-
poses tor lntu1t1ve knowledge. Intelleot1ve memory is an act we 
are acquainted with. We recall 1deas; a speecb is given from 
~r1. The tactual internal eV1denoe tor this aot of memory 
postulates a faoulty of memory, 8inee 9P,mUSl !t9U;ttyr dU., an 
act b.tokena a faculty, Just as every effect must have a cause. 
at oou.rse, the 1ntelleotive memory draws 1ta material. trom the 
,torehousfI ot 1ma.se. retained 1n the phantasy. There 1s a recall 
ot ,ensibla image', of phantasms. We recall an image of a fUl ... 
crum, of a triangle, of the written or spoken word. Upon this r. 
call of senSible 1lliages 1s baaed the intellective recall ot idea& 
However, to reoall an 1otel11g1ble species as essence oompletely 
separated trom 1ts aotual existence and indlv1dual oharaoter, 1s 
to recall the empt1 shell of reality, a shadow and a fiction ot 
what 1s really present in actually existing lndividual thIngs. 
As ~,result we are contr~nted with the chasm sp11tting our in-
tellectIve remembranoe of ind1vidual reallty from the material 
phantasm, and, 80 to speak, lts sensitive memory, the basis tor 
intelleotive memory. Thls severs memory from Its object. AS a 
consequence, we can see a great deal ot wealth and an 1mmense 
qUOd anima eeparata reoordari poteet,d.e tall natura exletente~ 
110et non ut 81~UlarlS. See also Parthenlus Minges, Joann1f 
l1IUl1! ~. ' . 1B9t~P! lhib9loPh!91 !! t heoJ,ogla, Florentlae, 930, , 93;"'203. 
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depth of thC'>ught in Plato's attempt to bind the intellect; to 
reality through the reoolleotion of "I4eas". To recall the ob-
Jeotive "forms" Plato lntimates the mind'. need for an objective 
basis for the universal ooncept it forms. a, There should be a 
lW,1verSAAft in 0, a common nature, which in its turn, conjoined 
to the spec1fio nature, serves, as a basis for ideation and recall • 
.A memory about the past. and an opinion about the 
tuture are the two kinds of imperfeot 1ntuitive knowledge scotus 
proffers; while 1ntu1 t1ve knowledge about the ne:ture. or 'the sin-
gular, as 1 t partakes of aotual existence, 1s perfect intu1 t1 ve . 
knowledge. a4 
passing over imperfect intu1 tl ve knowledge as an opin-
lon about the future, We see that the proof tor intuit1ve know-
ledge from intelleot1ve memory rest. upon the proof from our 
knowledge ot contingent truth.. This proof introduces the fourth 
member of the qUintet. 
lootus tells us that the human intellect can know the 
slngular a8 this slngular, because th1s knowledge 1s not dispro-
port1onate; nor 18 thl. knowledge contrad1ctory to the created 
-
2, Plato., f~~' e4. John Burn. et., Oxford, 1925. 728. -n~:l~: E. Taylor, l_~_," :u H!n J!:M ll1l.!t2rl. New York, 1936, 
24 scotua, Qa!. Qxona.tnSsh III, d. 14, q. 2, XIV, 527. 
in,.llect, •• intellect. The human intellect, however, cannot 
kDOw the singular, as this singular, from the nature of the un! ... 
•• rsa1, since this nature, as suoh, ls not contained determinate-
11, that 1s, as thls nature, within the notion of universality_ 
consequently J it the Singular 1$ ~own as th1s • insular , 1 t 1s 
knOwn through a species proper to 1 t. It is improbable that 
every speeles of all poslible singulars should be created at the 
.-me tlme that the human intellect knows them. The •• posslbl1i-
~1e. being infinite in number, there would be an infinite number 
of actual infinite speoies, and the indiv1dual could know every-
thing. 25 
lut should the human intellect bave a not1on of the 
.ingular, as 1t 1s s1ngular, that 1s not taken from things, stl11 
1t would be necesaarr to grasp the notion of the aotual existence 
of the thing, or 1tl non-existence. and also a notion of the ao-
eldents requ1red for the existence or non-existence of the th1ns. 
from reality. Th. reason tor thIs 1s ev1dent, s1nce from the 
not1on of quiddit1es and un1versa18, which are olearly necessary 
in nature, there can be no knowledge of the contingent proposi-
tion. Tbe existence or non-eXistence of things, however, are con-
tingent tao'-. Consequently, 1t 1s not adequate \0 have the 
II, 278. 25 Scotus, Q:W!!. Qxqnlens" II, d. 3,q. 11, n. 11, 
do'1on of quiddit1es or un1versals, in order to knOw that th1s 
.insular ex1sts, say, tor example, "SOorates here 18 runn1ns" t 
~U, It.ls a neOGssity that th1s not1on be taken trom th1ngs.26 
scotus confirms th1s oonolus1on. Should the natures.ot 
tbe terms ot the oont1ngent proposl tlon be oreated 81mul taneously 
,,1 th human knowledge, they wo~d have .. determinate or an lnde-
terminate significat10n tor the natures 01' the two terms ot this 
oont1ngent propos 1 tlon, tor example, that I tat down yesterdal. 
It the significatlon be determlnate, there 'WOuld follow no pos-
albl1!ty ot knowing that the propOSition 1s oontingent trom the 
terms themselve.. It the s1gnification is indeterminate, one 
OQuld never arrive at the determinate taot that I am Sitting from 
those terma. From tbis reasoning follows the neoe.81ty for 
taking from some other eource the certain knowledge 01' the con-
t1ngent propos1tion.21 
The ':ruth. that can be known by the intult1ve knowledg.: 
01' existing th1~J as they are exlsting, that ls, contingent 
vuths, cannot be known through the med1um of any specles what-
ever. The explanatlon rests in the taot that from the knowledge 
of the term. there can be no knowledge of the interlinking and 
existential truth oonoerning the two terms of oontingent oom-
26 11211\., 278, 279. 
27 .ill4. t 219. 
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plexes; that 1s to 8&1. of proposItIons Joined b~ the nexus of ex 
1etence, the oopula. "1t Is", or "est". The existential" truth of 
contingent propositions 1s not Inoluded wlthin the terms, .a the 
neeessary existential truth of the soientifio proposItion is in-
cluded in the speoies and in the terms. From this tallows the 
necessity for having some things present 1n themselves, in order 
that they may be known and aeen in themselves intuit1vely, to ac-
count tor the knowledge of contIngent truthS, whioh deal with ex-
lsting things, a. they are aotually exIsting. ThIs prooesa of 
knOwing contingent truths cannot be aooomplished in the common 
senUl. unless by means ot things themselves present 1n themselve' 
acoording to their own eXistence, nor on this aocount, can actual 
or natl1tual 1ntuIt.lve knowledge 1n the common genus 'be given the 
soul (ot Qbristta humanity) about all things. He makes progres. 
in knowledge like every other floul by knowing one thins after ~he 
other. 1n Qne way or anotber. In relation to imperfect intuit1ve 
knowle4ge, whioh remain., oarried about by the intellective me~ 
ory as. habitual intuitive knowledge, as the lett-over trom our 
perfect intuitive cognitIons, the same may be said that it does 
not know everything 1n 1t8 common genua. This tollows, sinoe 
many memories are lett in the mind trom the many Singulars known 
with pertect intu1tive knowledge. From these memories are known 
those obJeots, relating to the Oond1tions ot ex1stence, not as 
present, but a8 pa't' and in those oonditions ot existenoe those 
objeots had~ln the past,Sa 
scotus is a perfeotionist, ln the senSe that, whlle 
.eeing the ~apsed nature of man, he stl11 penetrates beneath this 
.tatus down to the natural oapaolties themselves in the intellect 
of man, and toreSe$s the resul ta these capaci tiel were foreor-
dained to produce. To get a ~tter view of these natural capa-
c1ties, sootus analyses the perteot status of knowledge as •• en 
in the Angels and 1n the human! ty ot Ohrist and ln the beatifio 
vis1on. Though hindered and held down to earth by the senses, 
sootus w111 nevertheless maintain that man hae these natural capa-
c1ti •• , say tor 1ntuition, however dulled in their lustre they 
• 
28 SOOtU8, Q:W!! glConl,ps!h Ill, d. 14, q. 3, n. 6. XIV, 
527, 528; ••• Ver1tatea Gagnoaalbil •• cognitione intu1t1va de 
existent1bua, ut exlstentla aunt, 801110et verltates oontlngen-
tea, non posaunt oognoscl per speciea quascumque innata., quia ex 
oognl tlone \ertilinorwn non potest 00gOO801 veri tas oomplexorwn con-
tlngent1um de 1111s terminie, qu1a illarum oomplex1onum verita. 
non lncludltur In terminia, sieut 1n speclebu$ at termlni8 earum 
lnoludltuI' ver1ta. necessarla complexionalis sc1entlalls. opor-
tet 191\ur propter verltatee contlngente', quae sunt de exleten-
t1bu., ut exlstent! .. sunt, oosnosoenda.. babere allqua 00J801;& in 
se praesentia, ut pos.lnt in .e intuItlve cognosol at vlderlJ at 
hoc non potest tlerl in proprl0 genere, nisi Ips!. rebus in .e .e-
oundum suam exlstentlam praeeentlbus, 8t ita 111a cognltl0 lntu1-
tlva In gene;re proprl0 actuallS vel habltualls, non poteat dari 
1111 anima. de omnibus, et quoad boc neOGsse est dicere quod pro-
tec1t, .10ut 8t a11a animal qula alla .t alla obJecta, al10 et 
110 modo oognovlt. Slmil tel' quantum a\ intultl.am 1mperte01lam. 
uae rellnqu1tur ex ls~ perfecta, quia de tallbu8 plur1bus per-
tecte intuItive cognlt1s derelictae sunt plures memoria., qu1bUs 
gnoscuntur 111a obJecta quantum ad conditlone. existent1ae, non 
t praesentla, •• 4 ut praeter1ta, ad hoc dioo, quod .tlam s10 non 
ov1t omn~a in genere proprio. 
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...,. be as the result of the soorchlng etteot.s 01' origlnal sln. 
"oreover, these oapacities tor dlreot knowledge are natural to 
p.an, since God oreated man wlth these potentialitles in Hls In-
tlnlte Wlsdom. 
To the obJeotlon that a present obJeot leaves only an 
1ntellig1ble speoles in the intellect and an imaginable speoles 
in the sensltlve faculty, the power 01' produo1ng the phantasm, 
~ootus rep11es that it leaves a memoratlve speole8, along with a 
.ens1ble speoies in the phantasy. The sens1t1ve faculty knows 
the object, in 1tselt absolutely, apprehending 1ts qu1ddity. The 
"morat1ye faculty grasps the object a8 1t was grasped in the 
[Past, so that the past apprehension is the immediate obJeot, and 
the immediate object 01' that past apprehension 1s the mediate ob-
Ject ot reoollect1on. Ab8traot1ve knowledge abst~aots tbe speoies 
01' the qulddity, as 1t 1s a qulddity, trom the speoies in the 
p~ta.m, whioh represents the obJeot absolutely, not ~ it ex-
lsts here and now or then. Intultive knowledge co-operates with 
the intelleot, grasping 1ts obJeot as present 1n its aotual ex-
lstence, and from this co-operat1on there results an hab1tual In-
tuitive oognlt1on held 1n the memorat1ve intellect. This habi-
tual intuitlve cognit1on is not or the quidd1ty a.bsolutely, but 
pr the th1ng known a. exist1ng, when 1t was perceived 1n the 
past, as a once existing past experlenoe.29 
29 ~ •• 528: Et s1 obJlo1tur quod eX re praesente 
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Al&ng with the proof trom sense analogy and conscience, 
~ngpre has in addition admirably summari$ed the proofs trom con-
~ingent truths and memory_ He goes on to say: 
Furthermore, all the judgments ot ex1stence that we 
torm and that expreSs truths purely oont1ngent ~ [agts. are 
cond1t1oned by the d1rect and 1ntu1t1ve v1ew of terms un 1 ted 
or separated by the intellect in the Judgment. The abstract 
or univereal ooncept, since it does not refleot the aotual 
ex1stence of objects, i$ incapable of signitying to the m1nd, 
that the terms--subJeot and predloate--are un1ted or sepa-
rated obJeot1vely. "It 1s not," adds sootus, "in the nature 
ltself ot these terms that the understanding finds the reason 
or the relation which establlshes a ~ these truths, for 
then these propos1t1ons would not be contIngent, but neoes-
sary, a, all that is taken trom the nature of things." The 
~on re11nquitur nis1 speCies lntellig1b1l1s in lntelleotu, et ln 
~arte sensltiva .pecles lmaglnabil1s, ut 1n vlrtute phanta.tloa. 
~oo talsurn est, qula de re praesente non tantum rellnqultur ape-
~1es senslbilla 1n Phanta •. l •• sed allqua ln potentia memoratlva, 
.' 111&e potentlae oognoscunt obJeotum sub alla et alla ratione; 
I1am una oognoso1t obJectum secundum s. ab&olute. apprehendendo 
~uidditat.m eJus, alla apprehendit obJeotum. ut in praeter1to ap-
>rehensum. ita quod apprehenalo praeterita est imme4iatum obJeo-
~um. at obJectum immedlatum illlu8 apprehensionls praeter1tae est 
~bJeotum mediatum recordatlonls. Ita etlam praesente aliquo sen-
~1bl11 aenaul, potest v1rtute 1111us cau.arl in lntelleotu duplex 
lognltio, una ab&trao1;1'V&, qua intellectu8 &gens abatrablt specl-
~m qulddltatis, ut qu1ddltas est, a spec1e in phant&amate, quae 
~praesentat obJeotum aoaolute, non ut existlt hio et nunc vel 
iunC; et alla potest esae ln lntellectu 00gnlt10 intultlva, quae 
looperatur lntelle.tui, et ab hao poteat derellnqu1 habitua11. 
lognltl0 1ntu1tlva iIllportata 1n memoria lntellectlva, quae 81t 
~n quiddltatls absolute, • II • sed oogn1t1 ut ex1stens, quando 
n praeterlto apprehendebatur, ut praeterl1t. 
An exoellent commentary tollowa q. 3, 529-532. 
For the doctrine ot Scotus on the agent intelleot as 
~he ordered act1v1ty of reduoing the potential un1versal or 1n-
~el11gible to the actual universal or 1ntel11gible, and ot making 
~he potentially understood Actually understood, and his dootrlne ~n the pOssible intelleot ae memory and lntel11gence, see Quaes-~lone. ~u2dllbetalts, q. 15, n. 16, XXVI, 146, 141. 
~-~----------------------------~ 
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attr1but1on of the pred1cate to a singular subject supposes, 
then, the intellectual 1ntuit1on ot the concrete and of the 
ex1stent1al. "Moreover," adds the l-iar1a.n Doc1;or, "w1 thout 
intuition, the 1ntellective memory 1s lessened, tor it would 
onl, conserve the 1ntelligible species 01' un1versal concepts 
and not the representation 01' singular objects perceived in 
their conorete ,..11tl.-30 
We oome tinally to the flfth member of the qUintet ot 
proofS in tavor 01' intu1t1ve knowled8e. Th1s is the proof from 
the natural capacIty of the human lntellect for the·beat1flc 
vision. 
Haunting Duns Sootus throughout his work is the status 
of the human 1ntelleot as it operates un1ted to the body ln th1s 
11fe, and 1t. proper status to behold God and the glorlfied Body 
01' Christ tace to faoe ln the beat1fic vlsion, in 1ts entltative 
status.'l The beatIf1c vis10n 1s Intu1t1ve, Since 1t would be 
impossible to have beatitude conslst ln the knowledge of an ob-
Ject, not. actually present and exist1ng, as ha.ppens through the 
phanta.sm ln abstraotive knowledge, but ltmuet conslst in the 
aotual taoe to tace vis10n ot God In HiS existential presence.,a 
The intellect as an intelleot has, the oapac1ty to know singulars 
d1rectly. the tmmaterial as well as the material, though al 1t 
• 
,0 II:Jf)l5Pr', "The psyohology ot Duns scotus and its 
Modernity, 42, 4,. 
31 Zacharias Van DeWoestyne, O.F.M., gYrsyt lhAlR!9-
Phl!UI, 2nd e4., Meohllnae, 193', II, 30-'2. 
~h ,2 Sootus, Quaest1qpes QYgd11btt!l!~, q. 6, n. a, 
XXV, a ......... 
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r operates 1n~he present life 1n conjunction with the body, 1t 
graspS singulars 10 • hazy way, that ls, 1t apprehends vaguely 
~be flrst lntentions ot the specifl0 nature, or haeecelty. 
Dorothea Ellzabeth Sharp presents observations on this 
polnt worth1 of notice: 
The intellect in 1tself • " " baa the power to know singu-
lars • • •• Yet in 1 ts present lite being hindered by bodJ. 
it can only vasuell apprehend them by gr •• pine; oerta1n gen. 
eral tirst intlnSipn!f of the hal-t'lta! such as numetical 
unit1. ln4epen ent ex stence, an ncommunioab11ity." 
,Since the b.e;'11'io vls10n 1s promised man, he must have 
the capacity for recelving this vision, since the -necessary pre-
requisite for reoeiving any perf.ction, be It·natural or super-
natural, acoidental or substantial, Is that the reclplent have 
the capac11Jy to reoeive It."}4 A miracle or supernatural aool-
dent or substance cannot fultill this tundamental need. Ohrist 
cannot 61ve sight to a stone, unless he first make. it an eye. 
God cannot.glve an angel or a human soul the vis10n ot Himself, 
wi thout putting into the angelic nature and the human nature at 
lts creation the capacity to reoelve the beat1f1c vision. Be-
cau •• of the need tor a natural capaol1q in aoquiring a pertec-
r----------------------------· 
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,lon, whether natural or supernatural, -all knowledge, eVen that; 
of the beatitlc v1s10n, 1s natural in the sense that 1t 1& 1n ac-
oord with the nature ot man.-'S 
There 1s no specie. 1n 1ntuit1ve cogn1t10n. Wh1le 'lihe 
sens1ble 1mage intervenes 1n abstraotlve knowledge, -thiS 001-
labOrat1on is not an absolute n~c.s'1ty, based on the nature it-
s.l£ ot the soul--otherwlse, the 1ntellect could never attain God 
and sp1ritual 8ubstanoe •• -,6 The collaborat1on of .ensible image 
and 1ntellect 1s not en'li1rely the consequence ot origlnal 81n, 
"slnce, even 1t it 113 1n the abaolute power 01' the 1ntellect to 
know without the help of the sensible lmage, it 1s none the less 
natural for the soul, united substantially to the bod7. to reach 
also the real 01 way of the senses and of the lmaglnation.·31 
The co-operation of intellect and imagination is partially ex-
plained bJ original sln, and part1ally by the natural order of 
the soul .et up by div1ne Wl.don tor the present state ot our 
11te.~ 
35 ll?.a. 
~6 Longpr', -The psychology of Duna Scotue and 1ts ~Oderni t1, 53-
37 llWi. 
~. 38 sooius, ~ gX2n!§QSI. II, d. 3, q. 8, n. 1" XII, ~~5: Hoe non est ex natura nec leta oausa est absolute naturall. 
usd est ex peocato .ed et1am e~ natura potentiarum pro atatu lato, 
qu1dqu1d d1eat Auguatlnua. 
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i The a.rgument trom the natural oapaoity of the human 1n-
tellect for the beatIflc Tlsion--to prevent violence being done 
IJ. natural fa.culty by changing its nature to reoeive a supernatura 
perfeotion--completes the quintet of arguments in favor of Seo-
tus·s positlon on intuit1ve knowledge. Thls 1s the fifth proof 
wolter a.dds to the quartet of :proof .. Shlre~l has discovered.: 
the Subtle Doctor establishes his theory of -intu1tive oog-
nition, over and aboft the abatraCtlve. on the following ert 
dencel firstly, by the fact of intelleotive memory; secondly 
b7 analogy with sense knowledge which 1s intuitive: thirdly. 
by reason of our knowledge of interlor a.cts whioh cannot be 
adequa.tely explained by abstractlve knowledge; flnally, by 
our knowledge of contingent truths 'which postulates intui-
tive knowledge.'9 
As sense perceives the object directly. so does the in-
tellect eminently. We view our singular 1nter1or acts ot intel-
lect and. w11l directly.. ContIngent judgments would be mea.n1ns-
less, unless the mind joins the singular term of the subject d1-
rectly with the actual exlstence of the singular term of the pre-
dicate by intuitlve knowledge. Memory of & species would never 
reach the actual existIng object wIthout intuitlve knowledge. 
With the specifI0 nature Joined to the common nature, eo that it 
is onl7 formally distlnct trom it, since "it ls such in essence 
and in ooncept that it can be thought ot by Itself, when 1t is 
not another thing, thoush w1th that other 1t may be eo closely 
,9 Oyr1l L. Shireel, O.'.M., "The Case for IntuItive 
Knowledge, .t1l!t Mod-1m tighgolWUh XXII, May, 1945, 227. 
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united that~not even omnipotence can separate 1t."40 and with the 
soul Joined to its faoulties in this manner, and the faoulties 
amOng themselves, intuitive knowledge of the specific nature of 
the 1nd1vidual being reaches the concrete ex1stence of the pro-
per objeot of the intelleot. 
It 1s the conoept ot being as the adequate and univocal 
objeot of the intellect that will be taken up in the followlng 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE CONCEPT OF BEING, THE ADEQUATE AND UNIVOCAL OBJECT OF THE 
INSLLECT.. AS THE mODUCT OF ABSTRACTIVE 
~'1) INTUITIVE KNOWIEDGE 
The formal object of the faculty of the intellect, as 
also the result of the prooess of the intelleot*s aoquiring know-
ledge, indioates something ot the nature of the prooess tor ao-
quiring knowledge. Consequentl,.. a study of the adequaoy and the 
univacit,. of the ooncept of being as the object of the intellect 
in the philosophy of Duns Bantus clarif1es the prooess of ab-
straotive and intuitive knowledge. These two processes produoe 
the univocal being of Duns scotus. 
The material objeot of knowledge is the thing in itself 
with its conorete existence; singular, ma:terlal, sensible, with 
its proper and common sensible qualities, with its individuating 
differences and. charaoteristio notes. An individual book, a par-
ticular person are material objects ot knowledge. The substan-
tial ma.terial form ot the material obJeot, or corporeal sub-
stanoe, is the bas1c raw ma.terial of our knowledge. this 1s the 
material obJect~. The material objeot ~ of the intellect 
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18 the phaetaem or sensible lmage produced in the proQess ot sen-
s~tlon. It is the intermediary in abstractlve knowledge. 
The tormal objeot of knowledge may be the proper formal 
object of the intelleot, or the common tormal object of the In-
t9l1eot • 
For st. fhomas Aquinas the proper formal objeot ot the 
lntel1eot 18 the essenoe of the sensible th1ng, beoause, since 
we are forms in matter, the prinoiple ot proport1on demands we 
knoW tis. form exlstlng individually in corporeal matter, but not, 
as exist1ns in th1s ind1vidual matter."l The common formal ob-
jeot of the 1ntellect as a faoulty tor St. ~homas 1s being as 
such, since of the intellect there 1s one object Which comprises 
all th1ngs known by the intellect. because nature is directed to 
one thins (otherw1se unproduct1veneas and inaotlvity would ensue 
because of the lndeterm1nateness of the faculty to anyone de-
tini te effect).2 On the other hand. the proper forma.l obJeot ot 
the intelleot. 1s being in 80 tar as 1 t 1s belng in the philosophy 
of Duns Scotus.3 This adequate obJect of the intellect corres-
ponds to the common formal object of the 1ntellect tor st. !ho-
, ... , I' 
1 at. Thomas Aquinas, ~. I-, I, q. 85. a. 1, Baslc 
~l~;Pf!,~*. n+°DHUl AgyiDAI, $d. Anton O. Pegls, New York, 
2 Aquinas,,9._ g,., II, 83, 9P!m Qp,pil, XII, ed.. Vives, 
Paris, 1872 ... 1880. 
3 Seotue, ~ QAonign§8, I, d. 3, q. 3, IX, 89, 90. 
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aas.4 ~lhi1e no object but the most general oan be adequate to 
the intelleot precisely as a faculty. for the present state ot 
our ex1stence, the state of union of soul and body, the qu1ddity 
of a sensible thing is adequate to the intellect as a motive.S 
The primary. proper, and adequate object of the 1ntel-
lent for Duns Scotus 1s being. in so tar as it is being. Being 
in so far as 1t is being 1s the first, natural, and adequate ob-
Ject ot the 1ntellect, because the proport1on between the ade-
quate object of the intellect and the faculty is a proportion ot 
natural order. The adequate object of the 1ntelleot 1s ot suoh a 
nature that it moves the faoulty. The faoulty is ot such a na-
'ure that it is moved naturally by th1s adequate obJect.6 When 
\h1s natural order between faculty and obJeot 113 present. the 
natural order between mgti:v:mo and mg)a,lSh the moving and the mov-
able, and consequently,. act and potency.7 then we have an object 
5 Scotus f .2m!.i QloDimil. If d. ,. q. 3. n. 24, IX, 1 
6 Scotus. Q2IDmI~ir.Ym ~ §'~tnk1a§t It d. " q. ,. 
n. 14, IX, 98: ObJectum adaequatum et. potentia 810 proport1onatur 
quod extremum ut eat obJectum adaequatum naturalitet>, poteat mo-
Tere potent1am, oauaando in aa cogn1t1(mem aUi, et potentia nata 
est mover! natura.l1ter a tall obJecto. 
7 Sootu8,.Qmul Ql2uleau, I. d. 3. 
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whioh 1s rtrat, natural, and adequate, and pert.ains to the In-
telleot as a faculty. Th1s natural order or adequation implies 
s kind of proportion bettleOn object and faculty_ "POl' Scotus It 
an object bl its very nature moves such and such an intellect., 
and an 1ntellect by its very nature is mot1vated by suoh and suo 
an ObJeot. IlS 
Although this natural order or adeQuation between fao-
ultY and obJeot ImplIes a proport1on, it does not imply a s1mi-
larity in the mode of being. The faculty and the object are dis-
s1milar rather than simIlar. The faculty and the obJeot are 
"proportionate to the extent that a proportIon requires a dis-
sImIlarIty of the things that are proportlonate. 1l9 This dis-
sIm1larity 1s found In tb.e proportIons of matter to torm, part to 
the "hole, cause to the thing caused. Duns Scotu.s modifies the 
prInciple of proportIon of st. Thomas bGt'tleen the modes 01' beins 
of faculty and object to determine tl18 objects of the Intellect: 
beoause lIe are torms 1n matter, wc) know torms in matter; oon-
sequently the proper formal objeot or the intelleot is the es-
senoe of the material thins.10 !be r.ason Sootu8 gl vea for sub-
8 Shiroel, YNX291t[ s.t Bta.M JJl P.!aDA SQQliPa!h 48. 
9 nis1 •• 46. 
10 st,.'fhomu Aquinas, 1 . .t., I, q. 85, a. 1, II, 813: 
q. 84, a. 7, II, 808, 809, q. 12, a. 4, I, 276. 
,t1tut1ng n1s principle of natural order or adequation tor the 
prinoiple of proportion of st .. Thomas is found in scotus's denial 
of the similarity betl'reen the mode 01' being 1n the faculty and 
object. The faculty 1s actually the potency and the movable, and 
consequently lt 1$ not s1mllar to the object, the act and the mo-
tivating element.ll 
For sootus being 1s the adequate obJeot of the intel-
lect according to mot1vation, Isuu.m&lWl x1£xHltlUh or virtually, 
and accordIng to predicatIon. 
BeIng ls the adequate object of the Intellect aocording 
to' mot1vation. beoause of itself alone it can motIvate the in-
tellect to a. knowledge Of itself and ot other things. "Thus 
.1DS oontains virtua.lly all thoae things which are .R!t. .. in-
tellIgible by' the Intellect, and it1s only through this object 
that different th1ngs are rendered Int-elllg1blEhft12 Just. as the 
divine essence alone and l2It. a aan mot1vate the d1vine 1ntelleot 
11 8cotus,.Q.ma.a 2i:sn;tenQ. If d. " q. " n. 4, IX: 
Oongruentla etlam lIla, quae adducl tur pro 111a. oplnione f nulla 
est. Po~entla enim et obJeotum non oporte~ ass1milarl in modO 
esmendi, se habent en1m ut motivum et mob1le. at 1ta se habent ut 
dlss1ml11a, quia ut ac.tua, 8' potentia; aunt tamen propertionata, 
qu1a ista proportl0 requlrit dlsalndlltud1nem proportlonatorum, 
sieut oommuni ter d.lCl tur in omnl proportlonEJ. slcut patet de 
materia et fOJlma, parte et toto, causa et causato, at ca.etaris 
pMportlonall rue J 191 tur ex modo eesendi talls potentla.e, non 
poteet eoncludl s1m1l1s modus esaendl in objeot. 
12 Shireel, 0nivgS1U 9L J3t2.M 111 ~ Sgetug, 70. 
to a knowledge of ltself, 80 belng ~ ~ and alone can motlvate 
our intellect to a knowledge of ltself and other th1ngs. Being 
lS the adequate object of the intellect accord1ng to a RIt ~ or 
natural motivatlon.1' 
The adequate object of a faculty according to motiva-
tion may vary aooording to th~ distlnctlon Scotus makes between 
the two types of motivation. There 1s the motivation that pro-
ceeds from the verr nature of the faculty, and. the motivat1on 
that proceeds from our present state of union of soul and body-
Being is the adequate object of the lntellect according to the 
motivat1on that proceeds from the very na.ture of the faculty_ 
The qUlddity of the sensible thlng is the adequate object of the 
intellect acoording to the motivat1on that proceeds from our pre-
sent state. l 4-
Be1ng la the adequate object of the lntellect acoording 
to predication. Being as such is the proper obJeot of the lnt81-
l' Scotus, 2! AnimA, q. 21, n. 2, III, 612, 613: 
Sciendum quod duplex est adaequatl0 obJectl; una secundum vlrtu-
tem ••• quod per se lp.sum solum poteat movere lntellectum ad 
notltlam sul, at aliorum, sicut assentia dlv1na est obJeotum ad-
aequatum prlmum intellectu9 divln1, quia est 8ufficlenter movens 
lnte11eotum divlnum ad notlt1am eu1 primo, et allorum ex conse-
quenti, at substant1a movet intellectum nostrum ad notltiam sui 
primo, at ex consequent.1, ad notltlam proprlae passionls, vel 
acoldentis. 
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leet. All things are known 1n virtue of their being. Oonsequen-
tly all things, as the various objects of our intellect, are de-
f1n1tely related to each other in virtue of their being. For 
this reason being can be said or predicated essentially of all 
objects that come within the range of our knowledge. Oolor, tor 
example. is the proper object 9f the sense of sight. Wh1teness 
and blackness are known because they are colors, and beoause they 
come w1th1n the range of the proper object of the sense of s1ght. 
Consequently, color 1s essentially predicated of whiteness or . 
blackness.IS Thus being is the adequate object of the intellect 
according to pred1cation, beoause it is of its very nature and 
essent1ally predicated of all things. I0 
The adequate object of a faculty according to predioa-
tion may vary acoording to the distinot1on Scotus makes between 
the two types ot pred1cat1on. .1a ~ predication, quiddltatlve 
pred1cation,or predicatIon acoording to a primacy of commonness 
d1ffers trom the pred1ca.tion accord1ng to a pr1macy ot implIes.-
15 ~.J 11. 
16 Seatue, ~ ~mi, q. 21, n. 2, III, 612, 61,: 
Objectum autem adaequatum secundum praed1oationem e~t quod per se 
et essent1a11ter praed10atur de omnibus, quae possunt e. pQtent1a 
cognoscl, siout lux, vel color, vel oommune utr1que praedlcatur 
essentla11ter de omnibus v1sib1l1bus: utraque autem prlm1tate ad-
aequationis, ens est primum objeotum Intellectua noa\ri. 
l 
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tion,17 denominnt1 ve predicat1on, or predioa.t1on in gUA.,_ l.n 
~ predioation means the predication of the essenoe 01.' a sub-
Ject in whole or in part after the manner of an essence, after 
the manner of subsisting, and not a.fter the mannerot merel, de-
nominating- The predioation 01.' the whole essence 01.' the substan-
ce results in speciel.h '!'he pred1cati.on of part 01.' the essenoe of 
the substance results 1n genus. A subject 1s predioated qu1ddI-
tatively 01.' Its inferiors whenever it is contained in its Inter-
iors. Since being is contained in genera, species, IndIviduals, 
God and crea.ture, being is essentially or qu1ddi tati vely predi .... 
oated of genera, speCies, individuals, God. and orea.ture. This 111 
~ predIcation is made acoording to the primacy of commonness, 
since being is common a.nd applicable to all things knOWable, mate 
rial and immaterial. In guaJ.1 predication, on the other hand, 
means the pred1cation of the essence of a 8ubJeot or of an acci-
dent after the manner of denominating. The predIcatIon of the 
essence 1 teelf after the marmet' of denominating 1.8 subst.antial or 
essential pred1cation and results 1n the speCIfic dIfference. !h 
pred1oation of an acc1dent after the manner of denom1nating 1s 
accidental predicatIon and results in property, should the accl-
dent be convertible with the essenoe. If the pred1oat10n results 
31. 
in an ultimate un1versal, 1t is a common accident. Be1ng 1s de-
nomlnat1vely predicated of its tranacendentals: unity, truth, and 
goodness, and of ultlmate differences, since belng 1s conta1ned 
virtually, not quiddltatively, w1thin the transoendentals and ul-
timate difference, that ls, wlthin qualitative conoepta.18 Being 
is contained virtually within ~he transcendentals, slnce being 
comes into the definition of the transoendentals as something 
added, not as something pertain1ng to their essence. The trans-
cendentals are pass10ns of being. Being cannot be predicated 1i1 
~ of its passions. Therefore being oannot be predloated quid-
ditatively of the transoendentals.19 A not1on predioated essen-
18 SoOtu8, Super YnlY~Ia.l11 E9rnbXr1t, q41 12, nn. 5. 
6, I, 155: Praedlcarl enim d.1v1dltur in praedloa.r1, la~, at 
111 gual;fh ta.nquam in per ae d1fferent1ae: quia 1st! aunt prim! 
modi praed1candi. itl2d1suwl ill~, est praedlcare essentlam 
subjeot1, per modum assentia., ld est, per modum subs1stentis, at 
non denom1nant1s1 et hoc cont1nglt dupllc1ter; vel quod praedlaet 
totam essentla.m subJeotl, e1:. al0 est SpeCies II • .. 81 vero partem 
essentlae. s10 e8t Genus. 51 en1m totam lpSUlll Genus speo1el es-
sentiam dioeret, sufflceret ad detin1endum Speclem, et Dlfferent! 
8uperflueret. l!EAe41pAt3a 1n gug.J.I' est praed.lc&r1 per mOdumde-
nominant1s, quod contlngit dupllclter; vel quod praedlcet subJeot 
essentlam, per modum denomlnantlaJ et tunc praedicatur lD. gual;1 
,1Ub§l:a.ntr:tg.1Sh slve ,u!!!nt4ill. et s10 est D1fferentia ••• vel 
ergo praedicat aocidens convertlbile, egredlens a pr1noiplls sub-jeot1, et. sic est proprlum; vel accidens commune, at s10 est ul ... 
timum universale. 
19 Seotue, ~ 002n1en~!, I, d. 3, q. " n. 6, IX, 
103: Passle per sa secun~o modo praedioatur de aUbJeoto • • • • 
irgo 8ubJectum ponltur in defln1tlone passlonls siout addltum •• 
se4 81 ens cad1t in ratione earum ut addltum, ergo non est per se 
pr1mo modo 1n ratione quldditat1vA earum. 
tially or quidditatively of another is predicated univocally, 
while a notion predicated 1n gual! or qualitatIvely ot other 
notions i9 a un1vooal predicate.20 Consequently from the stand-
po1nt of predication be1ng Is the primary adequate obJeot of the 
intellect, because In being is found. the dual primacy of common-
ness and vlrtuality, since every ~ml intelligible contaIns 
wIthln ltself the formal £at~Q of being essentially and vIr-
tually.2l 
Sooius distinguishes between the thins; and the n2!tlgn 
20 Sooius, .Qm:Ul 9atopll1UUh III, d. 7, q. 1, n. 5, XIV. 
,,6: Aliud est un1vocum praedlcatum, aliud est univoce pJ;"aedlcarl 
strlcte loquendo; Univocum praedioatum dlcltur oUJus conoeptus 
est In se unus; et hoc modo album dIctum de ligno at de laplde 
est praedloatum unlvocum; unlvoce autem praedioatu:r 11100. cUJus 
ratio est Ita una, ut praedlcatu:r. quod ratIo eJus 1ncludltur 1n 
ratione subjectI; et hoc modo denominativum non praedlcatur uni-
voce. 
21 Sootus, ~ Qxg~!nsi. I, d. 3, q. " n. 8, IX, 
108, 109: Dlco quod ens est primum obJeotum Inte1lectus nostri, 
quia In Ipso ooncurrlt duplex prlmltas, scl1lcet communltatis et 
vlrtualltatls; nam arona per S8 lntelllg1blle aut lnoludlt essen-
tlaliter ratlonem entls, vel contlnet vlrtuallter • • •• Omnia 
enim genera. et specles et individ.ua, at omnes partes essentialea 
generuttl. at ens Increatum: Ino1udunt ens quId.dltatlve •••• Omnes 
passlones entls Inoluduntur In ente, at In suls Inferiorlbus vlr-
tuallter • • • • Et ita patet, quod ena habet prlmitatem communi 
tatls ad prima intelllgibl11a, hoc est ad conoeptus quldditatlvoa 
generum, speolerum, Indlvlduorum; et partlum essentlallum omnium 
lstorum at entls Increatl at habet pr1mltatem vlrtualltatls ad in 
telllglbll1a Inolusa in prlmls Intelllg1bl11bus, hoo est, ad con-
ceptus quallflcativos dltterentiarum ultlmarum at passionum pro-
prlarUJ%h 
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". have or the thing. In reality being and. the transoendentrt.tls 
are convertible. In reality being is analogous. Oonceptually, 
bowever, being and the transcendentals designate distinct not! 
-here a slmple converslon no longer holds, for be.ne; oannot be 
predicated of its transcerdentals essentially."22 Being as a 
ooncept Is univocal in character "on the grounds ot its oommon-
ness applioable to all things knowable. material or lmmaterial.tt 
To better understand the :rela.tlon to heine; of' the 
cendentals Scotus distinguishes between "!.§.U. a §saentii" and 
"Jsse U!m e§s§n;t.if&l2.:YPr'« "1'0 'be of the essenoe" presupposes 
"to be the same essentially", but "to be the same essentially" 
does not presuppose "to be of the essence" j since ".t.!U1I. U el!ltD .... 
11&." is that lolhloh Is Included ~ AI. in the quidd.Itatlve oonoept 
ot the essenoe and oonsequently is contained. In Its qulddltatlve 
£lift'P, and Is not an addltion.. On the other hand, a thing can 
"be the same essentially" even though it is outside the oonoept 
ot essence, as un1 ty and truth for eXClmple. whIch are outside the 
conoept of being which 1$ prior to un! ty and. truth, but 1s not 
... 
23 .rusl. It 84. 
42 
really different from unity and truth.24 Consequently, Itthe 
transoendentals are not of the very ooncept of PllnS Itself but 
are, nevertheless, identioal with 1t."25 
Not only is beIng the &dequate obJeot of the intellect 
acoording to the adequaoy of motivation and predioation. BeIng 
1s the un1vocal object of the I~telleot. 
The conoept of be1ng 1s the univocal object of the in-
tellect. beoause being is oontained essent1ally or virtually in 
all thIngs or ooncepta by right of an JJl ml.1!1 or an 1n gUill pre-
dioation, and beoause the oonoept of be1ng 18 the product of ab-
stractIon and intu1tion. Be1ng, as the object of abstract10n and 
of 1ntuitIon, is a hIgher ,degree of being than the being that is' 
the object of abstraction alone. Oonsequently, being, as the ade-
quate obJeot of the intellect, and as the product of abstract10n 
and 1ntui tion, 1s p.redioated only un1 vocally, beoause being is 
predIcated or known 1n the same sense that it 1s apprehended br 
24 Scotus, In MetiPhy!.gmm At1§totel.a, VII. Q. 1, 
n. 2, VII, 351: Non enim idem est esse de assentia A, at esae idep 
essentialiter vel rea1iter ips1 A. P.r1mum quidem lnfert secundum 
led non e converso, qu1a de assent1a A praeo1se est 111ud. quod 
1ncluditur per ss 1n conceptu quidditat1vo A, at ideo pon1tur in 
ratione eJus quidditativ8., non ut addltum; poteat s.utem esse 
rea11ter ips1 A 1dem, 110et s1t extra conceptum ejus, puts. unitas 
ver1tas, etc. extra oonceptum entis, qui prior est 111is, secun-
dum Avioennam 5. non tamen 1111. dicunt rem a11am ab ente. 
25 GraJewskl, ~ F2rmA~ D11l~Dgk1Qn 2f DunA sg9~U!, 
133, 134. 
... 
the intelleot. and becaus. beIng des1gnates both the nature of' 
the sens1ble quiddity and the very act ot exIstence, or the very 
exIstence at th1s &ot. 26 G1lson says that beIng as the ad.quat. 
object of the Intellect implies the univocity or being, beoause. 
11' the intelleot has being tor its proper object, the intellect 
must be able to grasp being by a unique aot, and, consequently. 
to know it in the same sense in which the speoies or be1ng 1. 
apprehended.27 
Soatus proves being 1s the un1vooal objeot of the in-
telleot by showing Aristotle t • prino1ple of oausality presuppose. 
univooal predioation. Aristotle says "a thing has a quality in a 
hIgher degree than others if in virtue of it a siml1ar quallt7 
longs to the other things as well."28 A cauae that imparts a pe 
fect10n to some thIng enjoys that perfeotlon ln a higher degree 
than the effect rece1ving the perfection. This is true only if 
the cause ls a univocal cause. Fire is the hottest ot all things 
26 Shircel J UmyqglSt:r: 2t _~ In Jbm.I. ;}gS.r~l:l'h 79 J 80 • 
27 Etlenne Gllson, "Avlcenne et 1& Poln; de Depart de 
Duns Seot," j£gh1y¥, ~'Hi§~91~ POPir1nl1! ~ L1~t!~trt ~ MRXtD Ast, Parls, 1927 •..• 10 : El e imp lque 'univoclt de lTitre; 
oar a1 l*lntelleot a lt~tre pour objet proper, 11 dolt pouvoir 1. 
aalsir par un Elote unique, et par consequent le connaltre dana 1. 
mime sense quell. que solt ltespece de l'itre apprehends. 
28 Aristotle, Het~hlalg§, II, 1, 993b, The Works 2t 
Arlstotll. trans. Wm. David Ross t OXford, 1940, 23. 
because it"'is the univoca.l oause of all heat. If fire were not a 
univocal cause, but an analogical cause or an equivocal one, t 
f,he sun sou1d be the hottest of a.ll things, and not heat. 29 
Aristotle continues, tttha.t which causes derivative truths to be 
trUe is most true."3Q Unless truth be predioated univoca11,. of 
bOth first principles and of Qther things, it w11l not follow, as 
in the caS8 ot heat, that f1rst principles must be most true be-
oause they are the cause of truth in other things.,l Aristotle 
oono1udes that "as each thing is in respect of being, sO it is 1n 
respect of truth.":52 That which is the cause ot being 1s the 
sreatest being. This presupposes univoca.l predica.tion. God 1s 
the cause ot being; God is the greatest being; therefore being is 
univoca1ly predicated of God and creature." 
29 Shiree1, YDJ.xog1U J2.t Be~ns 1n D.!:m&l Scgtug, 81. 
30 Aristotle, ~!t~bls1gi' II, 1, 99'b, 23. 
'1 Sh1rosl, Yp1Iog1~X ~ ilins 1n ~ ag2M~I' 81. 
32 Arlatotle, Me~IRhx§lg •• II, 1, 99,b, 23. 
" Scotus, ~ An1mAt q. 21, n. 1, III, 615: Ostendo 
per intentionem PhI1osophi 2, Metaphysioae, text. 4 dlcentls, 
quod. unumquodque est maxims tale, quod est causa, quod a11a. sunt 
Univoce talia, ut ignis es~ calIdlss1mua, quia est causa un1vooa 
oaloria in all0, non autem hoc est verum de cauaa analogioa, vel 
aequivooa, quia tunc aequeretur, quod Sol esaet oalidisalmus, et 
aubdi t quod Rl:~JJU& pr:1Ug2.12"1 ~ ysr1§sa..t quIa aunt causa. veri-
\atla In aliis, quod non sequeretur, ut dictum est, nisi verltas 
41ceretur 1n utr1sque univoce; sed 8ubdlt, I~qyt ~ DiRfDf a4 
~. !1£ ~ yer1li~!m; 19ltur quod est causa entltat1a a l1a, '8~maxlme ens: a1 tamen ena dieatur de eis univoca, non alIter, 
Cum 19itur Deus sit causa entltatls all1s, at dlcatur maxims ens, 
Oportet quod ens dlcatur de Deo, at creaturis univace. 
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The seoond proof Scotue gives for baing as the univooal 
obJeot of' the lntelleot follows from the denial tha.t being is pre-
dioated of other things on the basis that the conoept ot being 
corresponds to God essentially and to creatures by partioipation. 
The concept of belng does not 'correspond essentially to God, be-
cause, if the 1ntellect has a conoept proper to aome one object, 
then the intellect can distinguish that object from every other 
object through the concept. Th1s 1s true because a conoept that 
1s proper to one objeot d09S not oorrespond to other objects. It 
the concept of being is not univooally common to God and to 
creature, then that ooncept wl11 be proper to God a.lone: it wl11 
correspond to God essentlally and prinoipally, and to other th1ng 
only by partioipation. Therefore, through the oonoept of being 
alone we could distinguish God from oreature. This is false, 
since t}-l..,rough t'tt..e ooncept 01.' being we know God only in a oonrused 
manner, in so tar as we know God through a concept common to Him 
and to creature. Oansequently, since a. proper conoept of God 1s 
impossible, there must be a common or univocal concept, predi-
cated un1vocally at God and creature, not analoGically nor equl-
vocally.,4 
-
)4 ~., 615, 616: Non dlceres ens analogice, vel &8-
quivoce praedloarl de alliS, nisl qula conceptus entis convenit 
Deo per essentiam, allis autem per partic1pat1onem. Sed quod non 
convenlat Deo per essentlam, probatio; intelleotu8 enim habens 
eonoeptum proprlum alicuJua obJeot!, poteat illud per lllum con-
ceptum distlnguere ab omnl all0, quia 111e conoeptus, qui est un! 
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1.he final proof Sootus gives for the univocal predi-
cation of being states that no real conoept is caused in the in-
tellect of man naturally unless it be by those things whioh natu-
~ally motivate our intelleot. But the things whioh naturally 
motivate our intelleot are the phantasm, or the obJeot shining i 
the phantasm, a.nd the active 1,ntellect. Therefore no simple con-
oept enters the intellect naturally, except in virtue of the 
phantasm and the agent intellect. But a ooncept that would not 
be univooal to the object as it shines in the phantasm, the onlY 
othel" possibility, would be different from the object and prior 
to the object. This conoept would be analogous. An analogous 
concept of this nature, however. oannot be caused by the phantasm 
and the aot1ve intellect; because any object shining in the phan-
tasm or the intellig1ble spec1es, by means of the aot1ve or the 
passive intellect, aooording to the ultimate of its power, as an 
effect adequate to itself in the intellect, forms a oonoept pro-
per to itself, and a. conoept of all th1ngs lncluded in it essen-
tially or vlrtually. The assumed analogous ooncept is neit.~ 
r I 
proprius, est incomposslbilla all1s: sed a1 conceptus entis non 
est communis un1voce Deo, at oreaturae, ll1e erit proprlus Del, 
at oonvenit Deo per esaentlam, at prlnolpallter, at a111s per 
partiolpat1onem. ut supponltur; 19itur 1ntellectuB noster per 
conoeptum entis potest dlstlnguere Deum a creatura, quod. talsum 
est: per oonceptUID. eolm entis cognosoimus Deum confUse tantum, 
prout habet cum all1s unum conceptum oommunem. 
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the proper concept, nor is it included in that proper conoept 
essentially or virtually. For this reason a proper concept can-
not be an analogous oonoept. To rely upon an analogous concept 
to know God would mean that we would never actually oome to know 
God. Since this ls false, the assumptlon of an analogous oonoept 
must be talse. Therefore, being must be univooal in its predi-
cation of God and oreature.'5 
The same argument that God cannot be known by the human 
intelleot naturally, unless the concept of belng is univooall,. 
predicated of the Oreator and the oreature, hOlds good on the 
same bas1 s for substance and aocident. A un1 vocal ooncept and 
univooal pred1oation 119 as neoessary to know God as lt 113 to know 
substanoe. A substance does not immediately mot1vate our tntel-
35 Scotus, ~ OXRn1I~I!h I, d. " q. 3, n. 8, IX, 
19: Nullus conoeptus ree:l"fs causa Ur in lntellectu viator1s natu-
raliter, niSi ab hls quae aunt naturaliter motiva intelleotus no 
tri, sed 11la aunt phantasms. vel objectum relucens in phantasmate 
at lntellectuB agens; ergo nulluB conceptus simplex tlt modo na-
turallter in lntellectu nostro. nial qui poteat fieri virtute is-
torum. Sed conoeptus, qui non ssset univocus alieul obJecto re-
lucentl in phantasmate, sed omnino alius et prior, ad quem lste 
haberet analogia.m. non poaset fierl vlrtute lntellectuB agent!s 
at phantasmatis, ut probabo; ergo talls conc~ptus alius analogus, 
qui ponitur na.turaliter in lntelleotu vlatoris numquam erit, et 
ita. non poterit natul"allter haberl allquis conceptus de Dec, quod 
est falaum. Probatl0 assumpti, objectum quodoumque, slve Nlues 
in phantasmate. sive in specie intelllg1bill cum lntellectu asen-
ts vel posslbl1i cooperante, secundum ultumum suae virtutis tacit 
in intellectu, slout affectum sibi adaequatum, eonceptum suum pro 
prium, at conceptum omnium esaentiallter vel v1rtuallter 1nclu-
sorum in lato, nee est lste; ergo 111e non fiat ab allquo tale 
movente. 
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leot to a knowledge of Itself, but only medIately through a sen-
sible accIdent. Consequently there 18 no quidd1tatlve ooncept of 
Bubstance, unless It be the concept abstracted from the concept 
of a.ccldent. Slnce no qulddltatlve ooncept can be a.bstracted ~ 
the ooncept of a.ocident exoept the conoept of being, it follows 
that, slnoe be1ng 1s unIvOOa.1, .1t must be predloated unlvoca.lly 
of SUbstance and accldent.36 
at. ~homa.A dlstingulshes tW() objects of the human In ... 
tellect. Because of the unlon of soul and body, the human Intel-
lect knows the essence of materlal or sensible things through the 
abstractive process of the active intellect. th1s object 1s pro-
portlonate to the human faoulty of knowledge: slnce we are forms 
in matter, we know forms In matter, or the quiddit1es of mater1al 
th1ngs. The essenoe of the sensIble thing ls the proper object 
or the proper formal object of the intellect. By reason ot the 
faculty consIdered as a faculty, the human lntellect knows b$lng 
as such, the common £1&19 of all thIngs abstracted from realIty. 
36 scotus, £m!.! O'BPIen,!!; I, d. 3, Q.t; 3, n. 9, IX, 1091 S1cut est e.rgutum, quod eus non est a nobls cognosclbl11s 
naturaliter. nisi ens sit univocum creato at lncreato. Ita poteat 
argui d.e substant1a et accidente; cum enim substantia non 1mmutet 
1mmediate lntellectum nostrum ad a11quam intel1ectionem sul, sed 
ta.ntum accidens senslblle, seqUitur, quod nullum conceptum quiddI .. 
tativum habere poterimus d.e ea nisi slt a1Iquis talls, qui poss1t 
abstrahl a conceptu acoident!s; sed nullus talls qulddltatlvuB. 
abstrahlb111s est a conceptu accldentia nIsI conceptus entla, 
erso, etc. 
r 
Being as allah 1s the adequate or common object ot the human In-
te11eot. 37 Be1ng 1s the tirst 1ntel1igib1e and the proper obJeot 
of the human intellect, because ttwe can conceive nothing other ... 
wIse than as a beins."38 
Duns Sootus 11kew1se dist1ngu1shes two objects of the 
human intellect. ScotU8 subst~tutes for the prinoiple ot pro-
portion the pr1nciple of natural order, a modif1ed princIple of 
proport10n. The primary object of the intellect 1s that which 1. 
common to all 1l'te111g1b1es. This 1s be1ng as such. Therefore, 
being as such is the primary. proper, and adequate objeot of the 
intellect. Because of the present state of un10n of soul and 
body, the qu1dd1ty of the sensible thIng is also an object of the 
intellect. The quiddity of the sens1b1e thing 1s the proper or 
adequate object by reason of the present state.39 
From the v1ewpo1nt of the objects o~ the inte1leot the 
doctr1nes of Duns 3cotus and St. Thomas seem similar. From the 
viewpoint of being they seem40 radically d1fferent. 
'7 Shiroel, Un1voclty of Being 1n Duns Scotu8, 84, 85. 
3S lli4. t 68. 
39 l.l;;>j4. t 85. 
40 R. P. Phillips, Ho4«u'n Ihom&IJle&g Philgsophy, Lon-
don, 1939, II, 171: tI ••• 1t 1s bY' no means clear that Scotusts 
own assertion that belng 1s univooal with respeot to the ten oate 
sories and to God and oreatures, i8 reallY' 1n contradiction with 
the view ot St. Thomas that 1t 1s not. Th1s may seem rash to sug 
geat after centuries of heated controvers1, but the questIon 1s 
TBe belng of st. Thomas is the object of abstraction 
alone. Belng tor St. Thomas 18 that to which corresponds exls-
tence. It ls the result of the prOCess of abstraction of the ac-
tive intellect whioh separates the eesence of the ma.teria.l thing 
from its material trappings, which hlnder intelligibIlity, to 
present the common rA~l2 ot all things as abstracted from con-
cretely exIsting things. Sinoe this belng ls abstracted from 
reallty whioh is sensible. it will natura1iy follow that it is 
predicated of a pure intelllgible suoh as God in a sense partly 
the same and partly ditferent,--the same by reason ot existence, 
but different in essenoe,--that is to say. analogously. "and be-
oomes available only when oorreoted by all the necessary nega-
tions."41 Being, oonsidered in relation to its inferlors, falls 
under the analogy of proper proportionality a.nd. of attrlbutlolh 
.. Formally.. belng 1 s analogous by an analogy of proportl cnali ty , 
for its unity oonsists in the unity of the relation or proportion 
of every belng to its existence. Vi.rtually, hOliever, being is 
\fhether the being of whioh Scotus a.sserts and S" Thoma.s denies 
tha.t lt is univocal are really the same "being". Both agree that. 
belng is not a genus, a.nd t.his admission on Sootus·s part would 
make his asse~lon that lt i8 unlvocal unintelligible, if he at-
taches the same meaning to "being" that St. Thomas does. In fact 
1 t s-eems tha.t the "beingft which Sootus ls speaklng of 1s not that 
belng ln general arrived at qy abstraotlng the essence of sena1bl 
things, which, aocordlng to 6t. Thomas, ls the proper object of 
the human intelleot, but merely the very nct of ic.,MiDS apart 
from any further determinat.lon." 
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analogous by an analogy of attribution, inasmuch as belng ls 
found ln a more perfect mode in SUbstance than in aco1dent."42 
For at. Thomas the a.nalogy of proper or metaphys1cal proport1o-
nality 1s an analogy according to intention and aocordins to eS8e, 
that ls, in concept and in reality, ~s1nce the th1ngs to which 
the terms are app11ed are not tdentioal or exactly the same eith-
er in intention or in ti.U.. Thus be1ng 1s pred10ated ot sub-
stanoe and accident. Here the common nature, being, 1s justif1ed 
in its reference to substanoe and accident sinoe both are neces-
sarily be1ng.4, Substanoe and aoo1dent, however, are being ac-
cord1ng to an order ot greater or less perfect1on. In th1s 1s 
found. the1r divers1ty.44 The ana.lo'gy of attr1bution 18 an anal-
ogy acoording to intention alone and not acoording to !!Il. that 
is, an analogy in ooncept alone. This analogy 1s present when 
one intention refers to many things aocording to an order of 
priority and. posteriority. although this intention 1s found to ex« 
1st aotually only in one of the references. Health, for example, 
exists intrinsically and formally and after an order or priority 
in th$ principal analogue. animal, but by an order of extr1nsie 
denomination and after an order of posteriority in the minor ana-
42 Shiroel. YntI92~\1 .2.t 13Jtj.M in ~ SpotM!!. 13 .. 
4, ~ ... 11, 12. 
44 St. Thoma.s Aqulnae.1n ,S!!ntelmta.s. I, d.. 19, q. 5, 
a.. 2, ad 1: (Analog1a) seoundum intentionem et seoundum esse, at 
r 
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logues. fooa and pulse.45 
The being of Duns Sootus, on the other hand J is the ob-
ject of abstraction and intuition. Abstraotive knowledge reaohea 
the Ideal quiddlty of being. In abstractlve knowledge the i~te~-
11g1ble speoles moves the intelleot. Intuitive knowled.ge views 
belng directly in itself. In intultive knowledge the objeot it-
self as present moves the intellect. Duns scotus believes intui-
tive knowledge is neoesaary to grasp the indlvidual being in its 
entlret,.* lntul ti ve know1ed.ge is a more perfeot klnd of know-
ledge than abstraotlve knowledge, sinoe it grasps qulddity and 
existential presenoe. "BtlnS as the product of both abstraotion 
and intui tlon is deolded.ly broader and of a more general charao-
ter than the btlW) ot St. Thomas. Viewing w1ns 1n th1s lIght, 
it was but logical tor Scotus to postulate the unlvocity ot 
beIns_"46 The belng of Duns Scotus reminds you of the pure inde-
terminatIon of Plotinu8, eo that 
When Duns ScOtu8 says that what fIrst fallS under the 
intellect 1s belng he no longer therefore understands with 
St. Thomas the nature of the sensIble belng as such. but ex~ 
1stenoe 1n 1tself, without any determ1nat1on Whatsoever, and. 
taken in 1ts pure lntelllg1bl1lty.47 
45 ~.: (Ans.log1a) seoundum Intentlonem tantum at 
non seoundum esse, et hoc est quando una 1ntentI0 refertur ad 
plura per pr1us at posterius quae tamen non habet esse nls1 in 
uno. 
46 Shireel, Ylll!gsl~;r .91 :§IlM 1n Duns Sg0!ru§. 85. 
47 Gllson,.Ib.t. §pi;cl5 at Me41IDl fhlJ.qs2Pby, 263, 264 
.... 
5' 
DUns seotus makes a d1st1nction between two aota ot the 
intellect on the level ot simple apprehension, or the 1ntellec-
t10n of a simple objeot. the abstractive act ot the intellect 
can be indifferent to an object as existing, and as not ex1stlng, 
and oan also be indifferent to an obJeot not really present. as 
well as to an objeot really present. We frequently experience 
this act w1thin us, since we understand universals or the quiddi-
ties ot things equally as well, whether they naturally possess an 
objective existence in some substanoe. or not, and whether they 
be present or absent to the intellect. there is an A IZ9.8\!J':lor1 
proof for this kind of abstractive knowledge. The knowledge ot a 
oonclusion, or the understanding of a principle persists 1n the 
intelleot equally as well, the thing existing, the thing not ex-
1stlng: the thing present, the thing absent. Since the one way 
or the other there 1s produoed the act of knoWing a oonc1uslon or 
understanding a principle equally as well, oonsequently there 18 
produced equally as well the 1ntellection ot that extreme--whe-
ther the minor proposition of the syllo51sm or the predicate of 
the judgment--on whioh depends the understanding of the nexus of 
the oonolusion, or of the principle. On the other hand. the in-
tuitive aot of the intelleot, not as oertalnly exper1enced within 
us a.s the a.bstra.otlve act, centers upon an objeot present and ex-
isting, as present and eXisting, because the 1ntellect should 
possess in an eminent degree the perfection of the sensitive tao-
... 
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ulty. Just~aa the proper object of the sense faculty ls the sen-
sible thing, as present and exlstlng, so the proper object ot the 
intellect is being, adequate and univocal, as present and ex-
lstIng.48 
Dune Scotus appreciates the dichotomy of Intellect and 
singular realIty, and the abyss between creature and Oreator. He 
endeavors to maintain by princIple the unIty that shines through 
the evIdent fact ot reallty.49 To aooomplish his project, Scotus 
-
48 Baotus, Qua,8§:t.12nt! g.UQ~JJb.!lt§!I!' VI, 8" XXV, 24, t 
244: ••• distingultur de duplloi actu lnte lectus, et hoc 10-
quendo de slmpllo1 apprehena1one, sive intellectione obJectl s1m-
pllcls, unus Indifterenter poteet esse reepectu obJectl existen-
tIS, et non ex1stentIs,et 1nd1fferenter etlam respeotu obJectl, 
non reallter praesentls, s10ut at reallter praseentis: 1atum ae-
tum :frequenter experimur in noM's: qUla unlveraalIa, slye qulddl-
tates rerum 1ntel11g1mus aeque. s1 ve habeant ex natura rei .!..Ii!. 
extra ln allquo 8upposlto, slve non: et Ita de praesent1a at ab-
aentia. Et etiam hoc probatur a posterlori; qula aoientia con-
clusionia, vel intelleotu8 prIncipII aequo in 1ntellectu manet, 
re exlstente, et non ex1stente, praesente, vel absente: et aeque 
poteat baberl aotus eoleDd1 oonolusionem t et intelllgeDd! prin-
clpluml ergo aeque potest haberl 1ntellectl0 extremi Il11us, a 
quo late actus lntelllgend1, quI sc!entlt1cus die! poteat, quia 
praev1us, e~ requisltus ad '91£1 oonolusionia, et ad tntell~Slr! 
pr1noipil, potest satis propria diel abstraotlvus, quia abstrahlt 
obJectum ab exlstent1a, et non existential praesentia., et ab-
sentia. 
Alius autem actus intelllgendl est: quem tamen non lta 
certltud1nallter experlmur 1n nobia: poss1bI11s tamen est talls: 
quI, soll1oet praeo1se f1t obJeot1 praesent1s, ut praesent1s: at 
eXistentis, ut exlstentls. Hoc probatur: quIa, omnis pertectio 
cognlt1onis absolute, quae poteat eompetere potentiae cogn1t1vae 
senaltivae, poteet em1nenter competere potentlae eogn1tlvae In-
tellectlvae • • • 
... 
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sees the ntfOesslty tor post.ulating a. type 01' being as adequate 0 
ject to the 1.ntelleot. that is common to the materia.l a.nd the im-
material. by' the oommonness of untvoolty, that is the product of 
abstraction and lntultlon,ln a word, univocal being. Being; as 
objeot- Of the 1nt..Ileot, enjoy. the primacy of motivation e.nd of 
predi cat1 on. Being, from the aspeot of motivation, is that ob-
Jeot whioh motivat.es the intellect ~A& and naturally, extend-
ins to things mater1al and immaterial, and not to a.bstraotlol'ls 
tram the mater1a.l alone t :Betng as the primary object of the in-
telleot from the point of view of predication, "is that object 
which can 'bf& predloated of all thins- without exception, but not 
in the ident1cal way. Of Ilmnlll~~1£ simple concepts, of ulti-
mate d1fterences and transoendentals, bf!1Di is predicated JJ1 
9YAJ.I; of all other things it i. predioated !n gmSL or qu1ddita-
tlvel1."SO 1A gllw' predicatIon 18 univocal predioa.tion. 1A 
QYii! predioat1on results 1n the univocal pred1cate. since 'being 
and l'mR~iQ'~1E simple concepts are oonta1ned within oth$ra wh1ch 
just,lty a univocal predioat1on. they ere oalled univocal predl. 
oates in virtue of this essential pr$d.ioat1on.51 Consequentl,-, 
for Scottle there 1s rigorous unity: the mind. indeed does 
¢, q ,.. U t 
50 Shiroel, Y»J,XSl9t,t,z at lIl,ni J..n DJmI ~9g:ti!aJh 86. 
51 'kl" . 
.56 
nott only attain the «fexolusive 1ntell1gible," but 1t grasp. 
also by intu1t1on. and in a direct manner. the matter 1tselt 
of the Judgments, namely. thEt singular and mater1al object, 
.and. all that 1s the objeot of experience and. sensibility. 
Thus. thanks to an 1ntul tion of the conorete and eXistent1al 
Ena. all the order of ceneeptl 1s solidly anohored to the 
real tU'ld brought back to un! \,." 52 . 
Just as un1 vooal being 2. a the product of abstraction 
and 1ntul t1on. ao also 18 th1s .ind,l vidual being knowable by in ... 
tuition and abstraotion. fbi. univocal u~&ga as the primary. 
natural and adequate ob.1eo\ of the intellect 18 more oommon 1n 
its oharaoter than the aensible, • _ " 1t 1s an object which 1. 
essentiall, 1noluded in every llIE a intell1gible, whether mate-
rial or immater1al, ••• 1t 1$ not limited but unlimited, ·and 
heMe all-inclusive. "53 The \Ul1vocal and adequate obJ$ct of the 
1ntellect is common to every material and immaterial 1nd.iVidual. 
We have also seen that Dune Sootue emphasizes the a .... 
ti,.. fa.tor belonging to the ;itrJi£! of an objeot. of reaUty. as 
the prlnolple of' aot1v1t.y, a.s opposed to 1ta more or les. atatio 
tlUUUUla.* The obJeot acts as a motl vat ins agent to oo-operate 
with the agent intellect to efteot1vely and termlMtlvel1 pro-
duoe the ooncept. Between abject and m.1nd there stands the real 
relation of the mot! vatlng factor of real! \1 to the movable In-
j '. f hi r f ,cPT 
I ~ longpre, "The Psychology of Duns Seot.ue and its 
Modern1 tr J 76. 
68. 53 Sh1roel, Y1d:ISUt1~X U It,,ib5 Hl ~ 151~t»Jb 61, 
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telleot, as also the real relation of the measurable intelleot to 
the th1ng measuring the intelleot.54 The foundation of t.hese two 
terms 1s found In the adequo.oyand univocity ot being to the in-
tellect. The nexus between the mind and the object is disoovered 
1n the abstractive and Intuitive knowledge of the indiv1dual 
Being. 
I These principles of Dune Scotus to the mind. ot Longpre 
resolve the Xantian antinomies that propose the paradoxioal di-
chotomy between the oreature and the Creator, and between sensa-
tion and intellection. On the basis of univocal being as the 
adequate and proper object of the intellect, and on the basIs ot 
its pred1cat1on in ~ or essentially of genera, speCies, indi-
Viduals, God and. crea.ture and of its predication J& gUi.1 or vir ... 
tua.lly of transoendentals a.nd of ultimate differenoes, resulting 
1n the univocal predicate, Seotue has brought together the ex-
tremes of unoreated being and. created being. Secondly, on the 
basis of the intuitIve knowledge of the singular, Scatue has pro-
vided the binding link or nexus between the processes ot sensa-
tion and intellection. 
By plaoing 1n the Ens the proper object of the intelleot and 
attributIng to the transoendental conoepts a representative 
value and a OOmmon intelligibility or of univooal oontent, 
507-5'9. 
r-
, 
" whatever may be the objects to which they are app11ed, Soow 
tUB has brought together the tirfO extremes of being-the worle 
and God--and at the same time by d1rect and univooal appli-
cation of these transcend.enta.l notions, surpassed Kantla.n 
agnosticism. tr18 solution of the seoond ant1nomy is offered 
not less surely.by the Soot1st1c psychology of 1ntuition, 
and of d1reot knowledge of the singular.55 
For an idea of the un1ty Scotus believes to ex1st in 
being and between the faoulties of the soul before the opera.tion 
of the intelleot we will consider in the next chapter h1s theory 
of the formal distinction. 
i5 LongprJ, "The Psyohology ot Duns Scotus and its 
l.foderni ty. 75. 
CHAPTER III 
THE FORf.1AL DISTINCTION. FINDIliG INSEPARABLE THE INDIVIDUALITY 
FROM TH.E COMl4.0N NATURE. AS \'lELL AS THE SENSITIVE FACULTY 
FROM THE INTElLECTUAL FACULTY. AS THE BASIS 
FOR INTUITIVE KNOWIEDGE 
To understand intuitive knowledge better it is helpful 
to understand the oonst1tutive elements of the object ot 1ntui-
ti ve knowledge, the 1ndi vi du a.l beinS. and ot: the faculty or know-
ledge, the sensitive and. lntelleotual powers. The individual 
being 1s composed ot its individuality of b.aecceity and or the 
oommon nature. both formally distinot. The sensitive power ot 
the soul is also formally distinot rram the intellectual potier. 
As the real distinction between the constitutive elements ot Tho-
mistic being, essence and eXistence, lends itself to a.batraotlve 
knowledge, since the rea.lly d.ist1nct essence can be separa.ted. 
from the existence by the power of the a.gent intellect, so an 
identity between the individuality a.nd. the common nature lends 
itse1t to intUitive knowledge, since the indiVidual being is a.o-
tually present to the intellect in its ooncrete existenoe. With 
the sensitive faculty really distinot from the intelleotive rac-
ulty, the agent intellect "1111 na.turally abstraot its speCies 
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.. frOm the sense phantasm. Wi th the sensl tl ve po,.,er identIcal wit 
the intelleotive power. tho Intellect will partake to an emInent 
degree of the senses t power of intu! tIon, since the proper object 
of the intellect is the indivIdual being, just as the proper ob-
ject of the sense is the singular material thIng. 
For a better understanding or the formal distInction 
and its relatIon to In'tuitive knowledge a fe,., words on the nature 
of a. rorma11 ty are in order .. 
Allan Wolter. O.F.M., says that a fairly aocurate and 
intellIgible notIon o~ a I'formalitytf is Uto consider it as the 
objeotive basis of a concept which, though real, does not repre-
sent the whole intelligible content of the physical entity, but a 
part only."l A forma.lity, whIle it 1s not a d1stinct physical 
thIng, is a positive something somehow less thM. a. thing, the 
rq.t~o gR.leej.~vi of a distInct formal concept, its objective baais 
It has lts own quldd,ltyor entity_ The formality exists by the 
existence of the thine, and. even God ca.nnot separate the formal-
ity from the existenoe of the thing. Just as there is a real 
distinction between the "lhole a.nd. its parte, eo there is a formal 
distinotion betttteen the thing as a. whole and. the single formali-
ties. This formal distinotion is 1nt\dequate, s1noe. in the d1$-
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t1notion bei''Il'een "a.n1mallty" and "sensitivity", tte.n1mality" in ... 
eludes "eens1tiv1ty". However, there is a modal distinction be-
tween a formality and its intrinsi c mode, as for example t between 
intelligence and its mode ot finiteness in man.2 
Aooording to the investigat10ns ot }~ur1ce GraJewskl, 
O.F.M., 1nto the lorma.l distinction of" Duns Scotus, a formality 
ia "a posit1ve entity 'klhlch, antecedently to the operation of' the 
intelleot, is inseparably and. really conjoined with the being or 
essenoe lllth1n which it is tound.. I*, Correspondingly, a formal 
d1stinotion is "s. distinction from the nature of the thing ocoUl."'-
ing between two or more really identical formalities, of which 
one, before the operation of the intellect, 1s conceiva.ble with-
out the others though inseparable trom them even by dl vine pow .... 
er."4 Th .• tonnal distinotion is a sS!$uJ.pdYnl ~ or restricted 
real distinction 1n tha.t the things distinguished do not have a. 
Simple 1dent1 ty f but only a !}!suw.4:wn g]l~ non-ldent.i ty. A §ICW'" 
~ 9Ji!1s1 distinction exists when, the identity inta.ot, there ex-
iste a diversity in these tllree cond1tlons:5 trom the nature of 
2 IJ?W;., 22-24. 
3 Mttur1ce J. GraJewski,. O.F.M_ 1 lllS!. F,g;rmp.J, Distinction 
.at .PJmI. S90!rJUh Washington, D.C. t 1944, 7th 
It ~.t 9'. 
5 sootus; R§PQJ:1.MP: ilPatbS1f.mS13J I, d. ,,; q. 2, n. 10 
XXII, 403. 
the th1:n.g, lJefore the operation of t.he intellect, on. formality 
is oonceivable \'lithout. the others. t}1..ough meta.physioa.11Y' 1nsepe.-
ro.ble. 
Pal'-thenius MinGes, O.F.M., states that eaoh individual 
being contains two fo:rmalitles, the common qulddltatlve nature 
and its indIviduality or haeoceltY'_ These realitIes in essence 
and in oonoept can be corw1dered by themselves, but the one is 
no way the other, even though they are metaphysically united so 
010se1y that even the PO,,,.3l' of God cannot separate them .. 6 Minge 
uses this statement from the oourse Seotus taught at ~AtOrd to 
prove his point, 
6 Farthenius Vdnges, O.F.J.l •• ~ At:a12J:.gllt iDeallY' 
RsaltamY'! £.tJl Duntl 6QgW~;, Munater, 1908~41: is 1st auoh wahr, 
dass moh 8CotU8 jedes Individuum aua zllel Entitaten oder Reall-
taten und somi t aua zwel Elnhe! ten besteht t niimlioh aua det" qui-
ditntiven oder der al1gemelnen Natur, una aus dar individuellen. 
l<la.g auah in der 1'llrk11ohkei t ein Jedes Ding noah so sebr eines 
sain una zwer derart, dass faktisoh weder die allgemeIne Ne.tur 
ohne IndIVidUation nooh die Indiv1duation ohne allgemeine Natur 
bestaht, Ja., ~11e wlr sehan werden, nioht einmal bestehen ka.nn, 
so kamen daran doch mehrere Reali taten unterachleden 11erden, vo 
denen die Gine nicht dle andere 1st. D1e allgeme1ne Natur 1st 
al:nmal tonnell, d..h. 1hrem Besrltt und Wesen Moh, nioht Ident-
Ieoh mit der IndIvIduation oder Realitat des Einzelnen, nooh um-
geltehrt.. Bald.. verh&lten s1ch fAwar nloht zu einander wie ver-
soh1$dene l)lnge oder tic.ahen, aber doch wie zwei Realitaten oder 
reale Teile ein und dareelOOn Sache. Genus utld Spezles eines 
DInges sInd. nioht slne andere Sache ala dae Ind.I vidualle desae!-
ben Dinges, wahl abel' sind sieRealitaten ein und desaelben 
Dinges. die formell VOn e1na.nder vel'soh1ed.en sind. See a.lso 
Parthan1us lUnges. O.F.)§.. '" "Duns Sootus, tf lll!. C§.M,bg~Q SYSl2-
Wil, New York, 1909, v, 196 .. 
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Quodlibet eommune at taman determlnabl1e adhuo poteat d1s-
t1ngul, qua.ntumque ai t una. res f ln plures rea11 tates for-
ma11ter d1stinotns. quarum haec formal1ter non eat 111a. 
Sed haec est formal1ter entltae slngular1s, at ilia est an-
ti tas naturae forma.l! tar, nee p01.3Sunt 1stae duae reall tates 
esse res at res, siout possunt esse real1tas, unde accipitur 
genus. at real! tas, unde acOipl tur differentia, ex qul bus 
realitaa·apecltloa acalpltur. !l)ed semper in eodem, slTe 
parte slve toto, sunt real1tates ejusdem rei f'orma11ter dis-
tlnetae.7 
Anything oommon and yet determinable, in sO far a.s it 
1s a singular thins, can be divided into severa.l rea11t.ies for-
ma.lly dist1nct, of which one is not formally the other. The one 
1s formally the singula.r ent1ty, and the other 1s formally the 
entity of the nature. These two realities cannot be taken as 
thing and thing, as the reality from wh1ch genus is taken. and 
the reality from 'lhich difference 18 taken, malt1ng the reality 
spec1:f'lc. The singular entity a.nd the entity of nature are 
realities of the same th1ng formally d1st1nct.8 
1'0 the oontrp~J, (}rajewski pOints out that in the Re-
RRrtAlA Pgr~§ten§~a Scotus names six formalities that constitute 
"eaCh compos1te having unitive 1dentity," namely, "universal and 
ind.1 vidual ma.t tar t un! versa;l and 1ndi vid.ual form. the un.1 versal 
and 1ndividua.l compoa1te. tf9 rue seems to be a more specific 
8 ~. 
9 Grajewskl t :at. lRral D1,1fiJ.lgti21h 95. 
r 
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division ot"'the general division Minges makes ot ea.ch lndlV'ldual 
being into the common na. ture a.nd 1 ts 1001 viduali 1:.y_ 
Duns Sootus places a forma.l distinction between the 
nMuro. S!gmm~ih to use his 'Words, and individuallty_ To better 
understand this distinction it is neoessary to examine nootus's 
position on the doctrine of th((t universals which is closely con .... 
neoted 'With the M!tu.r.A QgPlmYms, and his position on the doctrine 
of "haecceity", or the principle of indivlduat.lon.10 
Scotus says that the universal is trom the intellect. 
It is not a. figment. because nothing in reality outside the mind 
corresponds to a figment. To the un! versal there oorresponds 
SOIl'l$thing outside the mind, by whioh the intelleot 1s moved to 
cause an intention of this sort. Therefore, the universal 1s 
from the intellect effectively, but ma.terially or genetioally or 
oocasionally the universal proceeds from a property 1n the 
thlng.ll 
Duns Soatus dlstlnf.,'·uishes betlleen two types at univer-
sals. The subjeotive universa,l is a produot of the mInd, a 
seoond intention, the formal ~~Q of the thing oonsidered as a 
purely mental construct. The objeotive universal 1s the absolute 
quiddity of the thing. atlrat intention, the na.ture oonsidered 
10 .taa., 140 • 
It 97. 
11 Scotus, §YPfr Yn.ler§al~1 fOr;ph'tQ:= •• f q. 4, n. 4, 
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as nature," and the object of the second. intention. The a.bsolute 
quIddIty is ~Al neither singulBr nor universal but indif-
ferent. '.rh1s obJeotive universal as such is the object of' the 
lntellect.12 
"The universal 1s sometimes taken for a. second intention 
whioh follows the first operation of the intelleot by Which 
a. quIddIty 1s understood. absolutely • • .. at other tim .. s, 
however, the universal 1s taken for the thIng subject to t 
second intentIon. 1.e., for the absolute qu1ddity of the 
thins ,,,hloh 1s of itself neither universal nol" singular, bu 
ind.ifferent. Such is the d1reotobject of' the intellect 
which is not in the intelleot subjectively but only objec-
tively."l, " 
MInges oalls these universals the universal ~ ftlienAP or the 
metapbjrs1cal universal. and the universal in predioation or the 
logical universal"l4-
The a.ctual un! versal exists only in the intellect, but 
the potential universal, the same as the specifio nature of 
thinss, exists only in thinge.15 The potential universal posses· 
ses a speoifio Unity.lo This unity 1s not merely subjective. 
t J 
12 GraJewskl, ~ lamA. D3,ft:!t~n9t121h 142. 
13 scotue, R!. .\t:WnA, q. 11, n. 14, Ill, 581. 1914. 
14 Parthen1us Minges, O.F.M., ~~~~ ~ ~-
tr:t.Imt Ml0til9PblcA & T.b!gj.9EJ.I&h Quare.ec~ , I, 
15 scotus. H$t'l2QaA.t'-llIt~I"mltil3:I' II, d .• 2, q. 5, 
n. 12, XXIII. 31. <h'aJewe· , Ill!. lomftl D~st,=;p.ctc1-ml' 142 .. 
16 .14$1., d. 12, q. 5, n. 11, XXIII, 30. .ll?JJl.t 14.3. 
L 
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bUt, because of its real existenoe, tl1..1s unity 1s objective. It. 
1s not 10g1cal nor numerical, and though 1t 1s less than a nu-
merioal unity. it 1s a real unity.IT We understand the nature 0 
the potential un1ve.raal b7 understanding the o.octr1ne of the 
DAEWa Sl9l!llYn3.s. 
In the world outside the mind. only individ.uals exist 
actually" Scotue follows Av1cenna. in saying that the compo.sl t9 
indiv1dua1 ohares a common ot' universal !"'..a.ture, whioh in reality 
is not common, nor universal, nor partioular, but 1ndifferent, a 
nature only.18 The common nature is the same as the unlversaJ. 1 
the th1ng, the 8po011'10 nature 1n the thing, Yn~ver&U!rJ:it in m,. 
and differs from the universal in the intelleot, the second in-
tention, the 1mb vet§IJa! 1n In:lfeJ,;t!ot16. The common nature exists 
in the indiVidua.l in so far as it 1s conoeived as common 'by the 
lntt)ll,eot. but it does not exist 1n the individual as a. common 
nature. If the oommon nature did ex1st in the individual a8 a. 
common nat.ure, Uthen 'tfe ",ould be foroed to a.dm1 t the exie'tence 0 
Platonic idea.s or the really existent un1versals."19 '!'he oommon 
n. 8, 
17 i'bld., n. 12, XXIII, '1. ~. 
18 3cotus. 1n lietPJ2hy§;LSlm £1 stotc!l3.§, 
VII, 458. 'W. VII, q. 18, 
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nature is not a simple lasieal beinG, since it 1s not a pure tiS 
ment of the mind.. If the oommon nature "~jere a pure fl£5tllsnt of' 
the mind, "vrs vfould knOl1' nothing about reality, but only about 
our concepts, and our opinion would not ohange from the true to 
the false with the ohange in the existence of e. thing.MOO 
The universa.l or common nature can exist only in indi-
viduals. The oommon nature 113 indifferent to the aotual exist-
ence or non-exlstenee of thlnga.21 The oommon nature in itself, 
however, is non-existent, but exists in the individual whioh re-
presents it.22 TIle universal as an actual or logical universal 
oannot exist as a being, since to be existing as exist1ng 1s c 
trad1etary to the notion of too universal In rw1tlhthat ls, t.he 
purely menta.l oonatruet.23 Therefore the existence of the com-
mon or un1 versa.l nature 113 more aingulv.r than un! versa.l, sinoe 
it is not universal unlaoe in the s1ngular. 24 The intrins1c re-
PT. 
20 scotu8, 1n ~~tQ!bi§~~~f!O~tft VII,.q. 18, 
n. 10, VII. 459. GraJews i, . e _~ ____ .§t ___ Dn. 144. 
21 Scotus, ~ O;;S2NenfUh II, d. " q. 11. n. 11, 
XII, 278. lbi~. 
22 Scotu0, ~ Oxoni§Q§s, I, d. 3. q. 6, n. 8, IX, 
1l:l1$1. 
XX, 41. 
24 Scotus, l.n HPtil2h;vs1.SUYD A9:at~tre~3.~, VII, q. 13, 
n. 23, VII, 424: Quod cum extra. sensum d a:n. (scilicet univer-
salla), 1mma.nlfestum est utrum aunt, vel non. RespOi1deo, hoc 
r 
I 
i 
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latlon bet\1een the individuality and the common nature is so in" 
tlmate that with the oorruption of the individual or compos1te 
goea the destruotion of the universal no.ture conta.ined l11thln 
i1'..25 God restores the common nature by oreating new individual 
with this rmture,20 or by producing anew this same speoies 1n 
another Individual.21 
The rP2Q~i§ aR!9~§~s§~, or prerogative speCies, is 
t'the common nature of a. thing "Thlah in 1 teelf is neither singu .... 
lar nor univarsal--lt 1s the nature as natura; that is \"lhs;t the 
natural causee in the process of knowing f1rst produoe 1n our 
intellect., "28 
Singulars and individuals are the only really existing 
th1ngs. These are beings, and not "be1ng as such", and as belng 
they are known 1ntu1 ti vely. The!Ul.i. gommwa&Ul1mm or tfbeing as 
I . 
sst de oogn1tlone 81 est, sive rei in propria. exlstentiae, sic 
etle.m de universa11 est imman1festum, nisi sciatur necessarium 
1n aliquo singularl; quia. tamen taUs exlstentla est magis sIn .. 
gular1s quam universa11s. quia non est universa11s nis1 in sin-
gular!, 1deo s1c singular1a mag1s dicuntur non scibilia. quia 
ta11s cognit10 magis compet1t e1s. ~. 
25 'b~s1. ~., 145. 
26 Bantus, RttP2rtltA Parll*!ps1fh II. d. " q. 1, 
n. 5. XX. 581. Xb1~. 
16!. 27 Scotus..2WA O"'2n1~nwih II, d. :; t q. 1, n. 4, XII t 'b'~. 
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suoh" 1s the most general ooncept drawn from and prescinding from 
lndi vidual be1ngs with their formalities of oommon na tUN and 
haecce1 ty. and from the intrinsic modes of fin! ty and lnflni ty. 
tfBelns as such" is not a. reality, but only a predioate, though 
much broader in predioation than any universal, being oalled & 
t:r(;)·naoendental for this reason. Since it 1s a pred.loa.te and no 
reality, it cannot beoome the object of intuitive knowledge. 
Thus, the t.W!. C~il4mvm is a concept that is as transcenden-
tal as posaible.29 Intuitive knowledge on the part of the intel-
lect bas tlle individual being as its objeot. 
We will now look into the rela.tion of the common nature 
to tht".t individual, their distinction, and the part played by the 
individual properties in relation to the oommon nature. In hie 
doctr1ne on the w'l1 'Versals a.nd. the common nature Sootus differs 
slightly or only apparently 'with the traditional sohool. In his 
dootrine on the prinoiple of indiv1duation and "haeecelty" Sootus 
differs radically with the trad1t1onal school.3D 
T~ common nature in the quiddity of things is the S8.tlle 
as their generic and speoific natures. These natures do not ex-
29 Cyril L. Shiroel, O.F.M •• "Abstraotiye and Intui-
ti," Knowledge in Relation to Being .• " fl:O!~!§a.llfl Sl.t. .th!. Amera,sum 
CtJtbQUg illtlsi2pha.211 A'Hi2e~a.t19nt XIX, . Ii 9. 
30 Grajewak1, Ib4 rpWl D3,s;Y,nglt3,o'h 145. 
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bauet IntegfallF the oomplete nature of the indIvidual similar to 
the way that the genus does not exh&ust the specIes.,l There 113 
in the IndIvidual an IndivIdual property that perfects the com-
plete nature of the IndivIdual. In the IndIvidual there are two 
entities or I'ealitles or forma.lities formally distInct: the unI-
vet'sal and. the particular. !h, universal forma.l! ty 1s the oom-
man element, the essenoe, the ;Qett,uti gomm1Wl~h which is oommon to 
everr individual liithin the same species. The part1cular for-
mali ty is the Ind! v1duali ty t the haeooel ty. or sln[,'Ular antI ty f 
whioh oonstitutes the indivIdual as auo~.32 Duns Seotue tells 
us that the intention of nature 1s fulfilled in the apeoles. as 
if in something more perfect than the g~mu3, sr..d It 1 s fulfilled 
in the indIvidual, in a more perfect and a more real entIty than 
the entity of the speolss.33 T11ia gives the Ind1vidual more per-
feotion and a ne"1 posit1on 1n the domain of metaphysIcs and scl-
ence."" st. Thomas, however, says that the ultllJ1.ate tendency in 
_ r 
31 :Jaotus, In lDt~iPFwa!SAlll Ar!atotf;Q1§, VII, q. 13. 
n. 13_ VII, 413. Grajewmti. ~ Fermfl Dl§~lnot.so. 145_ 
,2 SootU8, ~ft QcPnbOn@l, II, d. " q. 6, n. 15t XII. 
144, ~. 
33 Dcotus, ~RO~I lDr~i.fnft1it I, d. 36, q. 4, 
n. 25. XXIX, 457. 'P~Q •• 1 • 
34 Baotus, 1n H!;t.A]2h;:l:slPBm AQatotd!Jr3.1h VII. q. 1,. 
n. 17, VII. 417: Ind1v1duum est verlss1me ena at unum ••• 
Longpre. "The Psyohology 01' Duns Scotus and. Its Modern! ty , t1 63. 
~. . 
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nature is to1lard the species, and not toward the indivldual nor 
the genus.3S The individual finds 1ts place with the universal 
as the objeot of the 1ntellect and of knowledge 1n the individual 
'be1ng of Duns Scotus. 
The ind1vidual ent1ty tram which is taken the indivI-
dual differenoe is not the matter, nor the form, nor the com-
posite. It is the ultimate reality of being of the matter, the 
form, and the oomposite. Duns 3eotus tells us that every qu1ddI-
tatlve entity, whether the part of 80me genus or the Whole genus, 
ls of itself indlfferent, as a quldditat1ve entity, to thIs or 
thatentity. Oonsequently, as a quidditatlve entity 1s naturally 
prior to thatent1ty as it is j;hi§, and &s it is prior naturally, 
just as it does not correspond to it to be ~, so from I1',s own 
formal nature its opposite--to be ~--is not contradictory to 
it. The composite in so far as it is e. nature does not include 
its own entity by which it 1s ~, nor does matter In so far as 
it is a na.ture include its entit.y by which it is this ma.tt.er, nor 
does form include its own entity in so far as form 1s a nature. 
Therefore, this entity is not ma.tter, torm, or the composite, in 
so far as any of these is a nature, but 1t is the ultimate reali-
ty ot the being that 1s matter. or tha.t 1s form, or that 1s the 
II, 821. 
35 st. Thomas Aquinas, ~. 1-, I, q. 85, a. 3, ad 4, 
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oomposite.:56 Since ma.tter, form, and the composite can all be 
-
conceived as un1versal, they oannot be the principle of indivi .... 
duality a.s such. Duns Scotus distingu1shes b$tween the nature 01' 
ma.tter and 1ts individual1ty as "this matter," tha.t is, between 
the common nature and' the haeooeitY".'7 
~he indiv1dua1, as S\lch, exists beoause of something 
positive that makes 1t exaot1y what it 1s and nothing else. This 
posit1ve entity is the "YJ.tl¥ £!A;U:NI§ en!ris" ,,8 or the '*:b!.tA-
oe1tea»".'9 
The formality that makes up the 1ndividual is not mat-
ter, since the same singularity found in the oorrupted being 1s 
not found. 1n the generated be1ng,40 nor is it quantified matter, 
since a change in the quantity of an object does not mean a 
change in its lndlvidua1ity,41 nor is it an aocident, since acci-
dents presuppose something prior in nature Which 1s substance, 
XII, 144. 
XII, 144. 
36 
'7 
,8 
Gra.jeweki, Th! EPtma. D~stlncN~2n, 146, 147. 
scotus t ~ 2ognl@n§8, II, d. " q. 6, n. 15, 
'9 Scotus, Reportata Parisians18" II, d. 12, Q.. 5, 
n. 1, XXIII I 25. ,1;44 •• n. 14, XXIII, '2. 
40 ScotU8, Q:ma. Oe;£mlen&e, II, d. 3, q. 5, n. " 
XII, 124., 125. Grajewsk1, Ibi. Fo~ Dl§'k.n<tt12P, lSO. 
41 Gra.jewsltl, Si!9~miJ. R1mtr1sctlon, 150. Sharp, 
Fra.M,aSAn MJ.o@opGx a1 0 .. . 111 ~ IhJ,1:;t.een14b C!mm:y, 303. 
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and for thi~ reason oannot individuate the 8ubstance.42 Exist-
ence is not the ca.use of indiv1duation. because what is not d1s-
tinct of 1tself ca.nnot distingu1sh another. Existenoe 1s deter-
m1ned to dIfferent genera and species by the determination of es-
sences of which it is the existenoe. If existenoe were not so 
determined by esaences, existenoe would have proper genera. spe-
cies and d1fferences besides the determination of its essence.43 
The composite does not cause individuation. that iS t materia.l 
substances are not individuated ~~, so tl~t what giv$S them 
realIty gives them a.lso individuality, as the Nominalists say_ 
Sootus believes that the nature of itself is indIfferent to sin-
gularIty and to unIversality_ -rhe nature beoomes singular by 
contraction by the thisness ot the thing, and It beoomes univer-
sal by means ot the Intellect.A4 Sharp tells us that "if a 
na.ture !A .u 1s a ~, the intelleot J when underste.nding 1 t as 
a universal, underatands it under a oharaoter opposed to its 
nature, just as it 1t were to understand Soorates as a un1ver-
89.1"45 The Nominalists' theoI7 tbat the nature of itself is a 
• • II 
42 Grajewsk1, lJJA F9£!llAl; P.,1st1ngt1on. 149. 
n. 7, 43 Sootus, In f''ktliby,1gy Arl?!:!io!r!U~, VII, q. VII f 1408. Grajewsk, ~ 19nnal R&liGwf4wt, 149. 
44 Grajevlskl, ~ E2mpl; p~!!~lngt1on, 141. 
45 Sharp, F.rtmgl§g~ PhlJ.9P0'Qhy. n OxfotS lnlbJt .%h~rte@n~b Qanteurl, 299 II 
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~ means "ha.t the nature 13.!. .!!. It.Y.S!. becomes the entire sub-
stance of diverse individuals, thus identifying the species with 
the whole nature of the individual.46 
Oonsequently, the entity that makes up the individual 
i8 the u~k~ relli~I' ent&1 of matter, and of form, and of the 
oomposite, "The individual is., therefore, not made up merely ot 
matter and form, but ot ~ matter and ~ form, forming ~ 
oompoSite or individua,1."47 Haecoeity adds nothing to the quali-
tative determinations of the 1ndiv1dual and 1s 1n no sense a uni-
veraal.48 The ha.eooeity 1s the element that "oontracts and oom-
pletes the speoifio torm by impressing upon 1t 1ts defin1tive 
se&1."49 It is the ultimate reality ot being, oontraoting the 
speoies, to make it one in number, incommunioable, and ex1sting 
by itself, or subsistent.50 
In every oreated thing a d1stinotion is made between 
the oommon nature, oorresponding to the senus and the speoies, 
and the individual property or ha.eoceity, as humanity and Soora-
46 IM4. 
47 Grajewskl, Ib!. f9rmil !2~I~"nslflon, 152. 
48 Sootus, Repp£i~& Ppr111eplla, II, d. 12, q. 5, 
n. 12, XXIII, ,1. GraJewski, The F2rml.l n,=,t1n2t19D, 152. 
49 Gra3ewskl, 1bI. lQrJDldw D" stinQ1t1on, 152. 
SO Scotus. 8t~p'1tt. ~I""' II, d. 12, q. 8, 
n. 3, XXIII, '7. GraJew~~ ~ ~ D~sitnct12p. 152. 
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t101ty_ Tne oommon nature 1s universal, but not purely 8. 10gio& 
universal. nor a figment of the mind, but a nature as nature, in-
different to universality a.nd singularity.51 The COmmon nature 
1s also a metaphysioal universal_ Consequently, both 10g1cal 
be1ng and metaphysical being are the object of the intellect. 
ina j.!lgxUUl'~Um .!nJ! in both orde.rs is the objeot of the intelleot. 
Thus being 1s understood in two ways: as restrioted to the real 
order of things and of the ooncepts of first intentions, or as 
taken in the widest pOBsible oonnotation that embraoes both the 
real and the logical orders. It is in this latter sense that 
being is the object of the intelleot. fI~ngUN!t-wn" in the phrase 
W. 3dlQuAnt«l.g! !llI. bas a. dual interpreta.tion. Metaphysioal tmJ. 
imU rAP1iYm lIm. is understood speolfloatively, or in so far as 
lngYilltsWU specifies being to 1 ts proper and formal notion, that 
1s, tt.il 'helUS- w. 1ngygn3;.y; JmI. in reference to the object of 
the intellect 1s understood redup110atively, not specified to the 
formal a.nd proper notion of' 'be1ng .P.tU! a, but as that whioh is 
also a ft§KW;&'lt:um .~ formal notion ot being. In this reduplloa.-
tive sense logioal being 1s considered as contained v1rtually 1n 
real being which ~ ml enjoys this formal notion of being. 52 
In this senae logical and real being is the object of the 1ntel-
51 ScotU!!, 1a Htl:8J2r"1QY Arj.a!tp1'eells. VII, d. 18, 
n. 10, VII, 459. ~ •• 152, 53. 
52 acotus, 9gmmen~~Ym In 9Y!es#12n!1 Quod.1R!tAles, 
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lect. 
There is a formal diatinotion between the common nature 
and the haeoe.ity,53 since they both are formalities.54 These 
two formalities possess all the necesaary oharaoteristios of the 
formal dist1nction. The common nature exists actually a patym 
£@i. before the operation of th~ intellect.55 The common nature 
1s not separated nor can be separated from the indiVidual or s1n 
gular even by the power of God.56 Since these two realities can 
not be included in the aame concept, although they are separable, 
the positive reality. haecceity, 1s formally distinct from the 
nii)!J:f;l; QSUlYDlm.sa or the specific nature.57 Beoause these two 
real! ties oar.not be included in the same concept, their defini-
tiona muetbe different,.58 With the corruption of the Ind1vldua 
q. " 00. 4-7. xxv, 117-119. Shiroe!, I~ Up.iy;poll:z ru:.1fD.!..£Q.n-
.w. ~ b~1Jr£S 111 W. MJr91Uhi at i2lm Pil 5soliMI t 103. 
5' Bootus, In B!d~Ii:§.gf!m ~f~ot~tf' IV, q.. 2, 
n. 24, VII, 171. GraJewski, .e lomai RlitIlliitlsu. 153. 
54 seotus, ~ QeQ~ftU81. II, d. 3. q. 6, n. 9, XII; 
1,2. ~. 
55 Seatue • .2m:lA Qe2n2,eDlSh II, d. " q. 1, nn. 2-5, 
XII, 7-10. ~. 
x, 554. 
56 SOOtU8,.2:m:1.i QcOpJ.raHM;), It d. 3S, q. un10a., n. 12, 
.:t>.f3. 
n. 15. 
57 soatue, lD. i!j(IRUlstQY Al:taltg!tft11s, VII, q. 1" 
VII, 414. 415. ~. . 
58 GraJewskl. Ill!. Egrmal P1Bt1nslt1.Qn, 153. 
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follows tho"destruct1on of the universal or oommon nature. This 
destruction 1s similar to the destruotion of any other formality 
that inheres 1n a subjeot and undergoes oorruption.59 
The principle of individuation of Duns Scotue beoomes 
intel11gib1e t[1.rough the applica.tion of the formal distinction; 
and 1s e10sely connected with ~he formal distinction. seotue's 
teaching on the individual be1ng and the formal d1stinction 
brines out the richness of the indiVidual. Today stress is la1d. 
on the un1versal as the medium of aclenoe. 60 
The common nature really existing in things 1s thE) ob-
ject1ve basie for our universals, preventing their being fictions 
of the mind: «c'est qu'11 exlste, pcur ehaque ur0.verael. un sub-
strat qui soit ree1lement ldent1que 8. eat universel. tt6l ttor , 
b1en que cet intelligible en acte soit un objet 1ntellig1ble sin-
gul1er, cleat deja l'universal a.u sens de fnature commune at In-
determ1n$e t , done universa11sable."62 Thus, the being of Duns 
$cotUEI io conta1ned within each individual, as the common and. 
undeterm1ned 11.1:l ture of Avlcenna, and. 1n a senae, of Plotinus. 
59 1,W.. 
60 l123.g •• 15:3, 154. 
61 Etienne Gilson, "Les Se1ze Premiers Theoremata at. 
X, Pensee d.e Duns Soot, n ApMl!1 d tHts1eobr! POgtrinfi!,J,e !l. ~­l4'~ ~ MSI@n A/!&., Xl, 9 .. 93'S". 25. 
62 l,W., 16. 
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How then'can this position avoid nominalism: how can we 
obviate making of our universal ideas mere words, a tlltu§ Y9gi', 
the sound of air, with no obJeotive basis or true signification? 
The answer is to be found in leaving what is singular 1n the 
f1rst obJec\ of thought, and 1n understand1ng the natHrl of the 
object. To do this we must se~k for the principle of individua-
tion. not in matter, nor in matter gYlnt~~I~ '~6nfiQJ but In the 
intrinsio formality of the object known as hascoeity. Th1s prin-
oiple 1ndiv1dualizes the 8ingular. The singular is the nrst 
object of the 1ntelligenoe. However. the s1ngular 1s known In-
dist1notly, and it beoome8 known d1st1nctly when the intellect, 
after having elaborated these pr1nciples of the oommon nature and 
the haeco.ity, applies them to the singular. Consequently, the 
indistinct s1ngular 1s what we come to know at f1rst, but if 
there 1s question of dIst1not Intelleotlon, 1t is not the singu. 
lar, but the un1versal wh10h is known ln the first plaoe.63 
This primary objeot of thought 1s a complex object. 
Beoause it 1s complex, the intelleot has the r1ght to make a dls 
tlnction, considering one part as the object, wh1le preec1ndlng 
from the other. wbat 1 t grasps for consideration separately is 
then the "nature~ that 1s to say. "the common and 1ndeterminate 
nature" of Avlcenna. This 1s a basic part of scotlatl0 thought. 
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Taken in it~lf, the nature 1s nothing else than the essenCe 1n 
1ts str1ct senae. Oonsidering 1t 1nasmuch as it is a universal, 
predioable of many, is the business of the logioian. Cons1der-
ing 1t in so far as it 1s singular, individualized by its haec-
oeity, in its ultimate complet1ve form; 1s the business of the 
natural ph1losopher, or the physioist. However, in its indeter-
m1nation itself, as being itself, neither universal, nor s1ngu· 
lar, auch is in a word the consideration of the ~etaphyslcian. 
The nature of the horse, "equinityll, is ne1ther that which makes 
this nature oapable of being pred1ca.ted. of several individuals, 
nor that which makes it the .ih1I. 01' a. ~artloular indivldual, but 
1t is the nature of the horse. Scotus la fond. of the phrase Av! 
cenna uses: "equln1 ty 1 s nothing more than equint t,.. tt64 
Oonsequently. to fortity our concepts with an obJeot1'f1 
basis Sootus sees the necessity for seeing in the individual 
thing a common nature, formally dlstinct from the individuating 
difference or haeooeity. This common nature plays the role of 
the foundation in rea11ty for the universal con~ept. Scotus 
modifies the Aristotelian motto, *R~ill!9~1 ~~Q~Iftr§&~.um, 
tUm~l:U! ;'llt'5Y*grlYl.65 As a Christian meta.physician looking tor-
64 ~., 1,_ 14. cr. 24-28. 
65 Aristotle. lllxs1~H!t It 5, 189&,5. llla.. worl§ !2L A£1;\P\k', ad. Wm. Dav1d Rose, Oxford, 1908-1931, II. 
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ward to the1beatitic vision ot God tace to taoe,66 h~ qualities 
it substa.ntially to read: lnhJrJ,eglty! W. Ymnts{}J,1um Jl. 1?1nsy-
JafUC!.Wllt "!lUlIul l2ansMJ,t:rlum ltNl1;Ylh 67 The 1ntellect oan know the 
universal and. the singular, wh1le the aenses are reetrioted. to 
knowledge of the singula.r alone. Singularity as singularity is 
not intel11gible to our 1ntell~ct in its present state, as un1-
ted to the body- Singularity is intelligible as such to the in-
tellect taken as a faculty separate from the body J and will be 
known by our intellect at the beatific vision. Know1ng s1ngular 
natures in this life, and knowing that they are singular, is no 
guarantee to our percel vins the exact formal rea.son why they are 
singula.rs. Thus our clear and distinct oonoepts, doflning the 
eseence of reality, are partial and inoomplete conoepts, s1nce 
they exclude the concrete indiVidual in its . full intelligibilitY' 
!hese concepte and det1nitions represent the common elements 
only--those Eit~2;!' held in common actually or possibly with 
other 1ndividuals. Sootus postulates the DA~i 29mmYP'. to pro 
tect the objectivity ot these notions. the definltions at the 
root of all soientifio knowledge. The D!tH£~ ggmmYA4S is for-
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mally distinct from its principle of indiv1duation, "endowed wi 
its own proper un1ty, whloh 1s somehow less than numerioal 
unity, •• ~ (and) as aotualized in concrete lndividual th1ngs, 
forms the immed1a.te and proper object of the oonceptus realls."6 
i'he Scotlst1c concept of the ina1 vidual be1ng, mooe up 
of the common nature and the individual dlfference of haeoceltYf 
both formally distinct, 1s the object of the intellect and its 
dual prooess of knowledg$: abstraction and intuition. Abstrac-
ti ve knowledge reaches as far as the essence or oommon nAture. 
the ideal quiddity_ Intuit1ve knowledge completes the proces& 
by reachlng the first 1ntentions of being, the ex1stentlal pre-
senoe shin1ng through tl~ ind1vidual difference. In abstraction 
the intelllgible specles motivates the lntelleot, but the th1ng 
present in itself is the motivating object in intu1tive know. 
ledge. Only by plaoing e. formal distinction between the common 
nature and the 1001 vidua11 t1 to produce the really 1d.entica.l 1n--
dlvidual belUt".!;, oan the individual being be the ObJeot of the 
dual process of the 1ntelleot t s aot of understandins: the a.b-
stra.ct1ve a.nd the 1ntuitive. 
'rhe intuitive knowledge of an a.ctua.lly ex1sting and 
-,------, -. 
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present ObJeot has a structure built upon the synthesis of the 
univoclty of the concept ot belng--there is an analogy among 
ua;t.;Lx existing belngs--from the forma11 ties of the common nature 
and the individuating difference or haecceity, both formally dis-
tinct. Here is the contInuity of formal d1st1nct1on or real ide 
tity to be found 1n univocal ~ing. To be understood is the to~ 
mal distinct10n or real identity exist1ng between the sensitive 
and intellectual powers ot the soul, though not between their 
operations, giving them their continuity. The link ot intuitive 
knowledse seems to supply the continuity between univocal being 
and unified soul. 
We come now to the tormal distinction as it applies to 
the sensitive and intellective powers of the soul, serving as the 
basis for intuitive knowledge. 
Seotue bases his strongest argument in tavor of a tor-
mal d1stinction between the sensitive and intellective powers of 
the soul on the principle of oontro.dlotlon. Before the operatio 
of the intellect oontradiotories are predioated of antmality and 
rationa11ty 1n man. Sinoe these oontradictories cannot poss1bly 
belong to one and the same 1nd1stinct subject, these oontradic-
tories must be formally distinct. Contradiotories are predIcated 
of animality and rationality in man before the operation of the 
intellect, beoause the principle of similarity with brutes be-
longs to animality in man, but rationality laoks this agreement. 
r 
.. 
The prinoiple of agreement and the prlnciple of dlsagreement are 
contra.diotory predloates. These oontradiotory predicates. how-
ever, inhere in one subjeot, the soul. Therefore rationality and 
a.nimality are formally dlstinot.69 
Before the operation of the intellect takes plaoe in 
ma.n there pre-exlst the formalities of animality and ra.tlonality, 
slnce "animal1ty in man is the sentient princ1ple and. the source 
ot all sensitive powers, while rationality is not. otherw1se ther 
would b& a two-told a.dequate cause in man for the same effects," 
and since lIanima11ty has a. true aptitud& to be communioated to 
many beings speoifica.lly distinct, whioh is not proper to rat1o-
nality_ n10 Th1s may sound like formalism, but we should remember 
that "form" and "formality" do not mea.n the same thing. "Form is 
really distinot trom 1ts subjeot, while formality is really iden-
tioal ,.,1th its subjeot. Different formsbEl'spau- a d1versity ot 
beings; different formalities do not imply a plurality Of beings 
but simply a plurality ot realities within a singltS ent1ty. Jt 71 
Formality is not a thins. it is a. !:!A 1"$1.72 On this score, w1th 
the forma.lity a reality of the th1ng, and with the formal d.is-
69 Sootus, ~ 0Ef~I~ft II, d.. 1, q. 5. n. 5, XI, 
19'. Gra.1ewsk1, Th§ FormAl jit19Ih 97. 
70 ~. lW.., 97. 98. 
71 Bcotus, ~ 2I2mr'U§!, IV. d. 46, q. :;, n. 5, xx, lla.a •• 74. 
72 1W.. ~. 
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tinction a division of the real dist1nction, perhaps the accusa.-
tion of exa.ggerated realism is also an alleged one. 
The second class of arguments in favor of the formal 
distinction, say between animality and rationality, is based on 
the terms of the di stinotion. There are many entities really 
identIcal which have different. defin1tions. Sinoe a definition 
expresses the nature of the thing as it exista A pgt! mor in 
reality and not as it 1s found in our concepts, a differenoe in 
definitions 1ndicates a formal distinctlon between really identi-
fied entities. Referenoe 1s here made to definitions that ex-
press the nature or the formal and qUidd1tat1ve eSI' of the en-
tity. the nature that the entity has prior to the operation of th 
intellect. that ls, IA DitslD r!i.. and not to a.ooidental or d ...... 
criptive defln1tions.13 
With the logical distinction inSUfficient to .xplain 
how oontradiotories are united with1n 8.. single ent1ty,74 and with 
the real distinction considered as too broad and drastiC, Duns 
sootus proposes the formal distinotion between the soul and ita 
faculties and between the faoult1es.75 
73 5cotus, p~§ OJO~IDII. I, d. 8, q. 4, n. 18, IX, 
Ibi~.f 99. . 
74 GraJewski f %hi. FgmAl D.,t,ngj;isw, 98. 
75 il?"s;\. t 169. 
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In reality the soul is identical with its powers. When 
we consider the powers of the soul formally or quidditatively ac-
cording to the strict notion or formal reason of the powers, they 
are not identical with the soul, nor among themselves. The pow- :i] 
era of the soul can be considered as different entities, reali-
ties or formalities of the sam. subject. that is to say, they are 
unitively contained within the essenee of the soul. In this sense 
the powers ot the soul are really identical but formally dis-
tinot.16 
In speak1ng of the identity of the sensitive and intel-
lectual powers of the soul among themselves and. with the soul, 
Scotus presents some subtle metaphysical cons1derations about 
un! ty and the "Sulntel:nllUcia y,a,2.i1xl-" Ent! ties completely 1den-
tioal are not unitlvel1 contained, because they are not united. 
Beings that have the same distinction between themselves that they 
had previous to the union are not unitively contalned. Entltles, 
however, that are really identioal but formally distlnct are uni-
tlvel,. oontalned. 'rbese.entlt1es are Un1tlvely contained in two 
ways. In the first way the entltlee ,are of tlfe na.tnre of the con-
tainer, ·as entities superior to the container, as for example the 
formal ~~R of whlteness, color, sensible quality and quality is 
reoelved by the same subJec~, and all theAe formal reasons are 
-
76 ~. 
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aupel;'ior to'" this \1hl.tenes$ al"ld 'consequently areo! ita ess~noe. 
In the gecond way ~nt,1 tie's ar~ unl tl vely contained. in a. eubjeqt; 
a;e lfsuhsequent to the subject. beqause t hey are properties of 
the eonta.iner, and icyr t h is ~eaSQn t hey are not distinct from the 
oonta.iner 1 te6'lf", 111 thi s way many pass1onsor properties are 
conta.ined wi thin DelnSf and a,r,$ notb1.ng ,other than being 1 t.self '.' 
fh€H~e tranae,endental p:rope.rtles, ho't'H&Ver, suoh as unity" truth an 
goodness are quid,di t 'atl Taly and formally distinct from a-neh othet' 
and. t~pm being 1t$elf" :By safeSUardlng thes$ pr()pert1es as real, 
m~taph181es i8 safe(5Uarded as a,;r>:ea,l ,science, Th~re is a. perfect 
parallel. sino~ in thet g-aTn<1J .. ",ay that being eOl'l.talns un1.tlvely the 
formal ,r&tlo' ,of unity. tt'tithand gOOanesB, t h e soulcont,aU1s un.l-
tlvely the f 'oI'lilal :t:"at1p ot' aens:l.t,1vity a.nd .!ntel1ectv:altty, thO,ttg 
t h ey-a.re formally distinct., 77 
Duns SC'QtU$ makes use of the Pl."01?oslt1onthat. 1fth1ngs 
have a l;"eal dlstln~1aon whenth~y ar~ really MpaX'B.ted, they~ ... 
ta.1:n t hat c1.istin¢t,1cm conceptually or fO\t'mally when t hey are not 
r$'al1y distinct .. 78 If theI'et lsac;ti);rtaln order ot', l"'~latlon be-
tW~E)n things ' 1vhe~1. they are real1y d1.stinot" they '3'111 retain thi$ ' 
order or relatio.n tr!hen they n.-re in a unitive content, ·C·onsequen-
-,,"'"-------
~T.' I. 'I. , 4' 77 ScotuStOPu$p:&,ont'en~Hh II. 4 ... 16, q. unlQs" . n. 17., 
A,I;. . t · 3. Gra.je1t sk 1 , ,The. Fptma';:t.~stJne.~lg!l, 169., 110 f. 
78,d:b1d." n~ 18, XIII f 43. Ip;t4 it * 172 .. 
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tly, the intellect is not an essential part o·f t hesQul, but is 
only un! tl valy contained. in the· soul as a. property t ,brbugh Which 
the soul acts" 1'h18 property or power, the 1ntellee't, is not for-
mally the s.oullg essence, but it is formally distinct, although it 
retains its real ldentity and unltyf.' We must imagine 'th~refore 
tha.t the soul has su~h a na.tur~ in the first instant, as it "rere " 
of 1 t"s ~xist~nce. In t heseeoncl instant of 1. ts 9xlstencre. sa to 
speak, the soul 1s operative or capable of Qperatlonaco.ol"dlng to. 
t his or' that power. The faoult,i.esor' powers vlhleh are the souroes 
of' those ,operations areQGntained un1 '\:,1 v61y itl t he c s·sen¢e of t he 
soul,19 
These pOlqerS are properties t ha't spring from the soul 
as from a subject. They ax-a ldent10al With the essence of the 
s()ul f 'and are called ptU"t,s of thE} soul, in t he s,ense that nQ ,one 
pO"1er is identical \"li th the entire perfeotion of the e ssence of 
the soul asoontalner, but 1s only a partial pe'Pfectlon of' the 
soul" If no one p.ower 1s identical \vlth the entire perfection of 
the e ssence of t he soul a.s container, t hen the pOvrer does not COn ... 
tnin the perf'eetlonof the soul i tS¢llr f. nO;r'the perfections of a ll 
the other pm1ers , even though the pm-fer and the aoul are t he same 
beca.use of the fOl"ma,l distinction.. Since t ,he perfeQtions of' the 
container a.t'e no't eonta,lnedmutually 1n t hemselves, because they 
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are formally <11 stinot from t he container f. but are rea.lly idemtica 
in respe·ct to So third, t he pOl1'era of t he soul also are not mutu-
ally contained in t hemselves; because t hey are formally distinct 
from t he soul, being really identical in respect to a t hird 
power. BO 
Francis Lychetus in .nis commentary on t hi s passage 
ca.rries t h e doctrine of t he formal distinction between t he intel-
lectua l f aculties. of t he soul to t he point where it includes a~so 
t he sensl tive faculty. The real 1de.ntlty and formal distinction 
between t he sensitive power and t he intellectual f aculty of t he 
soul seems contradiotory, since t he sensitive faculty 1s composed 
of t he intellectual soul and t he sense organ ; a.s for example, 
vision or touch. Si nce t he soul separated from t he body 1s no 
longer a sensitive power, it seems t hat t he sensit1ve power is 
really dist~-hct from thl~' soul . There 1s no contradiction .in say ... 
',e 
i ng t hat t he sensit1ve f aculty is really identica l 'fil t h t he soul, 
if t he senai ti va pov,ar i s oonsidered as a virtue of t he soul 1 t .... 
self, needing noopel"ation unless united to t he senseore;an. The 
separated soul 1s i nc apable ,Of seeing , because t he pOvlGX> of the 
separated soul necessarily needs a determined organ to' ha.ve this 
act Qf seeing. 51 
80 ~p~d.., lh 19, XIII, 44.lb!d., 173~ 
81 s eotus .. , cQmm!naor1!4 1n Sente.n:tlas. II. d. 16, 
q. un1ca; nn .. 22, 23. XI);I" 5. ~ •. , 173. 174. 
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tI Are the-senses superfluous , , 11 ~ c:t:'1.tlc ma.y a.sk? The 
soul is un1 ted to the bod y to aohieve 1 ts Ol>fn perfe'otlon from 
th1s union. Thi s union 'Y/o1.,l,ld not be useless t, 1f t his perfection 
could be aohieved in some o't her ""'Jay a.lso. We a 'chieve health no 
less by using a.n unguent, t han by using a. medicine. If both will 
give, health, the medicine 18 nt;'t. rendered-futile 'by t he useo! 
t he unguent .Oonsequently. kno"'vledge a equired by t r:e use of the 
senses ,., and. by another method in t he s'eparated. soul. does not ren-
der useless the union 'Of body andsou.l, making it convenient to 
.a,)qulre knO\'lledge by means of th~ sensible 1mage. !-1ore to t he 
point. is t he f~\at tha t t h e! union pisOH1 and body ,i nt ends the per-
f ection of the wholeconslsttng ot: t hoe,a parts '. lnsplte of the 
fa.ot that no perfeotion ,can a corue to t his part or to t hat part. 
"'"i thoutsuch a union, ne.vertheless, 't he union would not be \lse ... 
less, should the perfection of t h e ,vhole person . principally In-
t ended by nature, b~ achieved by means of intUitive k l"lOwledg:$ .a2 
: ,i - ' 
82 S OOtU8, ,onus Qxqn!em.se . IV, d.. .. L~5, q . 2, .xx, 305, 
30(5; l! •• non sequitur trustra. animam unir! eorpot'l. EstQ en1m 
quod propt er perfeotionem an:tmae fiere't iata unlo) utscili¢et aa ... 
qulreret perfeationemsuam ,ex tali unione, n.onsequltur qUOd frus-
tra ur:1atur, 81 per al1a.m vlam p~s seteam acqulrere; ,slenlm a,11-
quid ord1natu~ a.d f1nem; non frustrs. tit, 81 8.110 modo posslt 
finis a ,cquiri, slcuts! sani tas posei t aequlrl per lot1onem et 
potloneIl1, non frustra fit lotiO, o'tsl per potlonem posslt san1tas 
haber!; ita ets1 cognltl0 paselt acquirl per usum sensuum,et per 
allum modum ab anima sBpara.ta., nOn frustra fit unlo, ex quo 1psa 
donven1ens uno modo acquirend1 c.ognl t10nem <f 
Ali tel', at magi €I ad rem. quod unio anlmeoe ad ,co;rpus non 
est fina1iter propter perfect10nem oorporis, nee sola,J'1l perfeet,.1o" 
nem animae, sed propter parfectionem totlus conslstentls ex let1s 
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T~o predicate t h e intellective faculty of t he sensitive 
faculty a distinction 1s in order. Since the soul and. it.s pcn..;ers 
are :reall.y identical but formallydl stlnct, a mutual predication 
in t he Gonet-ete is admitted, but not in the abstract, The reason 
for thisls that t he poV{e~s 'Of t he soul are unitively contained ir 
1 ts essence but not quiddltat.tvely . Although in the abstract ani .. ' 
mality belO'ngs to' the quldd itatlv-e notIon 'Of man , it 1s "irong to 
say by ahstract! vepl"'edlc? t1on that ff human :1 ty 1 s animal '-ty ~ n It 
1.s right to pred.l¢a:t.~ln th~ e.onc:rete, however ; that "man 1s an 
animal. 1I We cannot pl"edlcate t he pcn'leX's of t he .soul of eaoh '0 .... 
t her in t h e abstract, as to say t llat nthe intelleot is the Will, II 
or #'the int,el1ect 1s t he sense faculty," but vJ$ can pl."edicate in 
the ccmeret~,t.t lntelle'pt,·lIkYA es!.e vol! tJXUm,H or '-'tho intel1ectJ. ve 
1.8 th~ sensi tl va .. tiS, 
The formal. distinotion C;')f t he soul and its facultl ·es is 
not t 1e s a.ma as Deseart.es f 1;'ea1 identi t..y heti>leen the soul 8.l1.d its 
thought. Bet"\·reen the soul and. its intellectionaand sensations 
Descartes pl a.ces only a logi cal d istinction. Sqotus , hot/ever. 
1'9.1;'1:,1 bus; ~t 1d~p Ii,eat. nulla pe1;l;'feotio poss1 t a.ocresoer~ hui~ 
part! vel. ill1, quae non pos set haber1sine tall unione j . t amen 
non fit f rustra unio,. quia perf.eotio toti'U.s , quod principal1ter 
lntend1tur a natura, non posset haoori ni 's! 1110 modo., 
XIII. 46. 
" denIes the ldent1 ty ot th$; SQul ~iith 1 ts 'O:P<13ra,tlons., ro1d~nly ad ... 
m1.ts its ld$ntltl '!lith l.ts powers or fa.¢'ttltl~s., 84 
W:~ sa,;r that ~he l"eal ldentlt;ybat, //e~n t he S()ul@d it.ll 
pt)Vl.X-S ll'le..ke$ th~ $'()ul a.ntl thro'Ughl'ts $seen(n~, t hna ma.k1na: th$ 
,sl!)uls1:mllar to GQ4. leada f,.Q pa.nthe.1stn~ fh$ tals1t,y ot\h1a 
B.tat.&n:t!l;lht,. 1.s brQught Qutby maklnethe proper dlst1not1nna 'between 
tbe soul a.n~ (}O,d.. GQd!a pure, ~¢t ., "rhile \hesoul is sUbj'e.H3l to 
the tl'ans1tl,en ~Qrn :potency to .a.ct, God 1e _ ,!.eJc8, s. $ubGl .$\~nt 
eaa~n..$· . Th'$ 8~ul is a.n (in,s , ·i:ilf., ~t aereated. fintt'$; Ii'LlI'l.d ~%'t-1 .. 
C.lpat$d. b~1ng*, Co:n$,~q,u"ntly~, 1t'the soul 8.",1;..:$ ~brough 1\.$ essenQ~ 
't.llt. ~bt.1J thr~ugh a c~.mm'Unlcat$d essence,' tMt is ¢re,p..t~d.t Qo·nt1n.io., 
gent an4:ps.rt1elp(3it:e4"B(itb;w$sn the e$Sen:e~ and Qpf1~aticn <l>f(k)d, 
a.nd 'f:;h~ $sa,n(}~ ,and theo.pera.t.lcrn of' t lhe fi3~ul 'f .tb~r'9 ·1s. ~ lnt1111 .... , 
l\:~ abysa.,t't85 
fh~. t 'ormal dl .stinctton b$,tlrt~en thes$nal t1 v~tt1€;ulty :~ 
the lntelle(ltl ve taeul t ;r * tha"~ 1.8 to s.ay " 1:.he1rreal i d$nt.l t.V 
lends ltself· t ,Q th~1n:tultlv~ knol'lledg6 of t he lnd1vldualbelns. 
wb,1ohl s bothtf~$;:Ii,~~.nt1ta:t undNa.t~e"':nhe1\/'a6 mad..e· :up of the. 
~nt.1t"a:tl va ntl ttl;"9 al:1dthQ ind! vidual natttr~. 'rhus W¢· ,sa,s the. \t~ 
argum~nt" 1.n f avor bi Intultlv~ kn()wl~dse baaed Q:nthe glml1~itY' 
e>4 Gl"aJewakj.,~. "!p;mMD~fp~~n(:ttt\oin,: 171. 
8.S IWA., '1'77. l18 • 
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ClI: ll k ' 
VQ jlt1ngest, .DatAn6f>pl~gbi , ~c:z.e .e!,~v! ~f:~1.sPlu&!) slli ~a 
59a~p$, 4:111 
Q't:' !ntellec£ual know1edae. t hough in an eminent deg:roee;, 1:11,th 
S$:ns~ knOvJ"ledse" sta'ms from th$ l;"eal I d.entl t::; Qf' t h e tntelleetlv,e 
and sensl tl ve PQi'lerS Qr facult.ies ot t he, $¢ul, adml tting_ h6\~leVlir~; 
a real <11 stln~tlQn beti'le~n the intell'ect1 va ,operatiob apdthe sen ... 
s1t1v~ ope!rat1on+. In a wcrd. while the powers are, 1d.entle!\l, the 
opera.ttOl'lfl arE); t'~~11rd1sM.not~, 
1!he t'0~al dietinc,t1on r ,1nde betore th~QP~:ra t1Qn ~,f thE 
intellect ' n$ common na.t~e1nB,~parable from t he individuality, 
and t he 8~:Q.si tl ve faeul.t,y i:ns$parable from t he intelleot! va ta,a .. 
ulty. i'he 1d$ntlt.y 01'" ~O\tnmon na:tut'e a.nd lncllvidu,a;11t1 glvaa Us 
the ,ind1vidual being, ' a.~ th~o,bJ~et. 91 tther Int&lle~t _ ~nd, i ~$ d:ua) 
proc$ss of'~nowl$de$, e.bstraet1on and intuit1on. 1he 1d.~nt1t.Y' o,t 
the se.ns1 t,lv~ l'fll1'ar. of t .he soul wi ththe intel1eet1 ve p,owe':r<;>f th6 
soul g1ves us a faculty or kn(),ltleqg~ that lS' u:n1qu:e, fu~n1sh1.ns tiE: 
ew·ounds tO$a,y that as \ he s9ne1t.:1 va t:9i~Ult1 has th$ power of in .. 
1(uit1v~ 1t;n~';Led,g~ of lts object" so t ,h$ 1ntellect,1'i1e fa.'Qulty 
pO'S$esa.s t .·· S POW$l'", but I n an ~mln~nt d~gre'e..lt 1$ 111 thl$wta'3 
tha.t , t he forma l distinct.iQn 'b~ar8 a ~fl1)·la.t1~n t .O l~t·'Uttlve knoll'" 
ldd'iS. jj e ·o '9 · 
A niod$rate o(:molusion d.l"a\'m from the pr'e:v1ou.a d.1J3:t)uaalQ · 
1s the ch.tal oha~acterot O~ knQ111~d,8~ ·. Our knQ¥tl~dge is ahertrac 
tl ve, but to be adequate must a.leo be 1ntul tl V('h Our knt:'wled.ge 
t'~lles on the$enslble i mage 'of the phantasm. The intellect ma.y 
know a thine;. not pr~s~nt 1n ,. t-s aotual .exi e.te:nee' by mea.ns of the, 
likeness ,ottheo,bJe:ct retained. in thes~nsible i mage . The!.m ... 
m$l.terlal qu1dd1t1 dX>Awn frol11 the matGr1al ot the ph,ant~sm., ea .~ 
universal concept, does not adequatoly ,re;prQsent th~ actually ex'" 
ist1.ng conc)ret,~ ind1vidual fr·om which it l'las t.ak:s:t'h (lOhE;lequently; 
t he mind dem~:nds ' ano·th$l" kind of knowledge" distlnct :t~Qm a'b$'et'ra~ ' 
t1ve knowledge ' in sRe2~~' to fulfill t he unity ·01' 1ntelle1!:.t a,nd 
singular mat;er1.a.l thin5s~ ~ble speeif1ck1nd of knol11edae 1sthe 
dlx-eot gr'aap O'f' t h e :t.nd.! \T 1 dual 11.8.tu;re . found. 1d.;0nt1t1~d 111\11. the, 
obJeot1.ve ~QIIUnOn nature. in t he actuallY existing cQneret:e t .hins _ 
It 1s t he iTJ1..medla.t:e k;n:(Htled.ga of ath1ng, present and ~;;dst1ns,~ ,~s 
present" and in 1 tsaetual ~x1stenoet lntul tlv¢ knm'fledge corn. ... 
pleinents $.'bst.~aet1,V'e knQwledg~ ,t AbstractivG kl1.ovll.edg~ a'UpPll<;1S 
Us ~'i1th t he e ssenoe of material things ; lntu~ tive kno 'ledge pre-
,. 
eentat~the mind . the s;etua:l ax1e'tencE! and ind1 vid.ual! ty o£. t he 
9:3 . 
e1ngular ttl~ ~ar!:a.l thing,. 
There is no doub1l that, in t.he O'Qmpoa;t tion of the hum~, 
'bOdy th~t'e is an unde'ru.able 11nkb~t"'leGn the ma.t~r1al taQ'Ulty ot' 
the SEtl1:se o:re;an a.nd 1ta ~o'ti, 9~nsa.tion., and, the lmmateJ.1'1al faQ-. 
u-i.ty of the intelleot and'" ts :ppoduot.the eO;n()elit~ Wb den,y a~y 
'conn&Qt1on 'OO-t1>leen aensat,"on a.!ld :intellection.wQul.d make o-t 
thQu.ght aeon~re'ttQn' o.f material pe;rtlcles fl:~)\dn8 trom the~'1 
ma.tte:r -0£ the brain a~lla. '3;'0 equate intellect-ion wit.h sl;Jl1sat1Qn 
would ~ to stop with sense knowlede;e in following t~ -oo~a~ ,of 
the pr()Cess or rQrrn1~ the 1d&a.;.Between the fQrma11t1es ~f 
Ita'e,naitlvtty tt-, the par-t,and t1a.nlma11tll1; the whole; and ,t1 l:"atl.o. 
na11t.Y'''. th~~ 1s ,tt t'c>rmal dlstlnct1on. an lnsepare,.'ble and real 
union in r~altt$!I, 'thu8 _., the 'emanatiGnaof se:ns~t1on o.verflow* -in 
a. sense" intoth$ '(')pel"a.tlQna fof the 1ntelle'ct. Tbe O~l'atl,f)n$ Qf 
the lnte'lle'ctjon t,he -ethel" hand., have a oond of ~;o.ntinu1tY' with 
the Q~~at1Qna, of the sense- facult1es" 1he:reseems tO$Jd.st a 
directness of }.ntel"o.'ct1on 'oot;\ll(~en t h$ faeultle-a and t~ a<::t or 
aenfult10n .~ 1ntel.leotl-em1> as in fa.ot there 113 an l.ltUl1edlac-3' 'be. 
tl-tet:m the -sensitive faculty and ~heQbject ex1st~nt1$.)'ly pres~nt 
to, th~ sense ,organ. 'fhe concept ot cont1nu1 ty bet,\·teenQ'bJe-ct and 
1nt$11e0t' ....... ~tween aeus,f3,t.iQn and intellection merely pushes 1 t 
blM,kto a mOl'e remote leV'elof rtta.tar1a.11 ty".demand.$ a. un1 V~frr,sal 
'term bf ,s'ign11'ic.atlQn fo,t', exp~ess1on. The term best sui t ,ed tOeX~ 
'p;resa t h1e ¢onO$lit seems t"o 'b$ttlntu1 t,1ve (;}ogni t11)ntf • 
95 
Nature is the tQl"'1llal pr1ncipleo.f ~Q:tlv1try~ Every, 
thing htunaUf' ol~gan1~;, or 1nQrga:1l1e has a nat~e t1"omt1'h1chflow6' 
t he capab1.1;tty of p¢rf'Qrmlng Va.riQus aotions pt'<>p$r to that 
natuvEh the.ee are the potent1a.11. ties ot nature., Man bas a tla.tu .... 
~al des1re fot' h61pplne$s~Only p\1r;f'eot happlnes$ls th~ end 
'i-lhlch 1'r111 sa.tisfy him Guffielently,.. Perfeot ha.ppiness i .e. the 
v1alQtl of (rod by the lntellet),t e,nd. unlc:m vd.th ft1m in wil:l., ~hl~ 
vision Qf GGl¢l t '/l,ee to f ·ae,e ~s an 1:ntu1ti,on. ~o avoid doing '1IJ'1<:>-
lenoe' to th~ ~tu,re Qf man, there must bee.. natu~a.l capae1ty with,, · 
1nthe intell'9ct tQr thee v.1s1.0n of God.". The oa:pae.l ty for th1'ti 
vision .1s natural: ~he glft l.tsel.f e.nd its ageney in the handa of 
God 1.a ;a.uperna.turallJi 
Certe.1n elt.i}ments of our 1tn(n"'ledg~ are 'beneath t he level 
of t{'i,Il"a.rene'ss. The rermat!~n of thee~ns1 'Ole expressed apeC:1·ee .1s 
t.l.tit. a.consc1ous Qpera.ti"on,. ~eopera.t1Qn()f th~ &gent intellect. 
~ludes djtir' o6nsciousnes8 ~T1:I,e$,imple; " instantaneous flasl"let;t ot 
thoUgh\ loo1Jl~ Us oowfldEl!red as to the1r e:xplanat,iJ)Pi' 'ihOUgi1 in ex:~ 
pS):'tieno.$ the.y are a fact . Asa.j,n lye knO'VT Ii tt,le ot the ultimate 
,cQtt,st..ltut1 V!if!I eleme.n~s of 1"'ea111;;,y. There aN fet1 essences we kM"W' 
, ' 
by the c(unp~ete de'f.1n1t1on "ot genus and spe~1f1c .dlff~"$nce.. One. 
lnstanQ'~ ,ool1Iro:nts us ~ It]: an i s a rat1on$.1 anlma.l 'jO:tt fh~ oontl,nu .... 
l~y bEiMiTe~lt the essenQj',f) and 'ezt1sit.ene·~ of 'bf11nSt ~tvm·en the $P:n .... 
at! tut1'V'e elements 0.£ oorporeal substan(H~, as bet\veen the au\? .... 
ste.no$ a.ild its accIdents, 1$ a thing of plr,of6und lIi;rst~:ry to the 
., 
hU11lan intellect 1n its pl"esentstate ~Yr uniQn ttl th body in thl$, 
''''Qrld,. 
fp aay that being is univocal" p;t"~diQated in the same 
'V19.y Qf God and creature. but diat,lnsulsh1l16 God f)'>om: e:r-eatureby , 
the lnt,r!nE31¢ d,aterm!n1ng nlode$ Qf HW1nlty fl and uf1n11.:.1u $ is, 
p~rhap$ t .."hat t he pe net rat.1ns 1ne1e:,ht Qf :f'e~'! men <;},ould ,,1s1p,n. 
The p$lng of' analogy and pa:t't1¢.lip~atlon may in 1 t 's tJphet'f) s,l$~ 00 
t hE) t :ruEl be1ngli ~th a:N.7 $jI'stema of ct>nt117geney, Dub:$ Soot'Us, 
hovleV'er,. presenta a system. pf' philosophy t htttt'restorE>S t;}<l'mpletel 
t() the 1ndlvid~al" e,nd~ven ·t:o t.he mate·l'1.al$ln~l~;r f' lta 1ntel-
11gibls 'value.Hl. 
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Thethest'. $~tted by Daniel Weftd.elin Prl.mao 
_been read ad approved 'W tl1ree '.m'be" or the Depart-
ment 01 Pb11~$Opby. 
The flnaloop1es haw beenexaminea lq' the direot6r 
·.t the -thesiS and the slpattU"e whioh appears below verifies . 
·the .faet that 8i!\J' neoessQ7 ehaages have been ineo:rpo:ratad·,. 
.' 
and that. the thesis 1, ~'W given .final approval with 
reference to· eontea"ro., ·~ IIll84baniCiU accura.". .• 
'1'_ ~1j18 1$ ~be~t.rt aoeepted 'in P$l*t1al 
fulfillment ot the :l"SquLl"$Plnts tor the~l~ot Master of 
Arts. 
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